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 1 
CHAPTER 1 
Folk Songs and Nationalism in China 
Introduction 
In China, there are 56 ethnic groups, with the Han ethnic group being the largest.1  After 
the collapse of the Qing dynasty in the early 1900s, the creation of a “Chinese identity” became 
an important issue for the Chinese Nationalist Party, because national identity was a novel, 
Western concept.2  Eventually, the “Chinese identity” became associated to the Han ethnicity to 
the extent that many scholars refer to Chinese nationalism as “racial nationalism”, because it 
promotes the myth of a uniform Han race with a common descent and culture.3   
Under the current Chinese Communist Party (CCP), however, this racial nationalism has 
become problematic, as ethnic groups such as the Tibetans and Uyghurs have increasingly 
voiced their desire for independence.4  Furthermore, domestic issues such as pollution, 
corruption, and inequality have become publicized sources of discontent among the general 
population.5  Thus, promoting nationalism in China, but in a more inclusive way than with the 
conventional focus on Han nationality, has become more important today than it has been in the 
last ten years for the continuity of the CCP.  
The CCP’s cultural policy is a significant element of its promotion of nationalism.6  And 
music, which is an influential vector of nationalist discourse, features predominantly in its 
                                               
1 Dru C. Gladney.  "Ethnic Identity in China: The New Politics of Difference." China Briefing, 1994. Ed. William A. 
Joseph. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993. 171-92. 
2 Enze Han. Contestation and Adaptation: The Politics of National Identity in China. New York: Oxford UP, 2013.  
3 Elizabeth Van Wie Davis. Ruling, Resources and Religion in China: Managing the Multiethnic State in the 21st 
Century. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. 
4 Wai-Chung Ho. "Social Change and Nationalism in China's Popular Songs." Social History 31.4 (2006): 435-53.  
5 Peter Hays Gries and Stanley Rosen, eds. Chinese Politics: State, Society and the Market. London: Routledge, 
2010.  
6 Sujian Guo and Baogang Guo, eds. China in Search of a Harmonious Society. Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2008.  
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cultural policy.7  This thesis explores folk songs, or min’ge, because folk music is an essential 
part of ethnic identity.  Folk music in China dates back more than 3,000 years and reflects the 
social, emotional, and spiritual lives of the people.8  In China, there are hundreds of types of folk 
songs differentiated by region, ethnic group, and the occasion in which the songs are performed.  
These folk songs range from courting songs of the Dai minority in southern China to religious 
songs performed by Tibetan monks.9  By definition, the creation and popularization of min’ge is 
an organic process, but since the Yan'an Forum on Literature and Art in 1942, where Mao 
Zedong encouraged the use of folk songs to spread Communist ideals, there has been the 
tendency for Han artists and composers to appropriate ethnic minority folk music for both 
political and nonpolitical reasons.10  
In contrast to the diversity of traditional folk music, revolutionary songs, or hong’ge, are 
homogeneous in content and written for the sole purpose of propagating and glorifying Party 
policy or the wisdom of its leaders.11  Hong’ge is perhaps more well-known by its English 
translation, “red songs”.  In addition to praising the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) 
leadership and achievements, hong’ge also promotes revolutionary idealism and ethics 
associated to the Chinese communist movement.12  The development of hong’ge and its 
popularization during the Communist Revolution reflects a significant turning point in Chinese 
music, as much of the music composed after the 1940s was similarly politicized.13 
In China today, min’ge exists alongside hong’ge and enjoys a comparable amount of 
popularity and state support.  In fact, it is not uncommon to hear many different kinds of ethnic 
                                               
7 Jingzhi Liu. A Critical History of New Music in China. Trans. Caroline Mason. Hong Kong: Chinese UP, 2010.  
8 Ibid, 56.  
9 Ibid, 60. 
10 Ibid, 70. 
11 Chengju Huang. "Power, Ambition, and Arrogance: Lessons of Bo Xilai’s ‘Singing Red Song’ Campaign as a 
Political Communication Project." Global Media Journal: Australian Edition 8.1 (2014): 1-13.  
12 Liu, 85. 
13 Ibid, 90. 
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folk songs on state-sponsored television channels, and the study of min’ge is a mandatory part of 
curriculum at most music conservatories.14  However, the genre of min’ge has significantly 
changed from China’s pre-Communist era to present day.15  Thus, min’ge today may not be as 
representative of ethnic identity today as it was before the 1940s.  These observations led to the 
following questions: why does the CCP support and promote min’ge, and what is the nature of 
min’ge today? 
In order to make sense of the current policy of supporting and promoting folk music, I 
will analyze the musical forms of popular music from three different time periods: the 1930s - 
1960s, 1960s - 1970s, and the 1970s - 1990s.  These time periods reflect major changes in CCP 
policies and important historical events, including the Second Sino-Japanese War, Yan’an 
Forum, Cultural Revolution, and Deng Xiaoping’s Open Door Policy.  I will then explore the 
genre of min’ge in depth and compare its development to the development of popular music in 
general.  Finally, to determine the basis of the current support for and promotion of min’ge, I will 
examine the utility of min’ge in the context of the current dynamics of nationalism within China.  
Ultimately, my goal is to provide new insight into the mechanisms of Chinese nationalism, and 
shed light on the CCP’s relationship with ethnic minorities.   
 
  
                                               
14 Clarissa S. Montefiore. "How China Distorts Its Minorities Through Propaganda." BBC Culture. BBC, 16 Dec. 
2013.  
15 Liu, 76. 
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Literature Review 
What is “Chinese Nationalism”? 
In the broad body of literature on nationalism, there are two main schools of thought. The 
modernist school of thought focuses on actions undertaken by individuals, mostly intellectuals, 
with the specific purpose of engendering sentiments of nationalism within a specific group of 
people.16  In other words, the modernist view is that nationalism is in a sense man-made, and 
born out of the structural conditions of modern society.  The primordialist school of thought 
focuses on the natural tendency of humans to organize into distinct groupings based on an 
affinity of birth.17  The primordialist view is that nationalism is inherent in human beings, and is 
a natural phenomenon.   
The study of nationalism tends to lend itself to the modernist point of view, due to the 
artificiality of national identity.18  In China, this is consistent with the fact that the concept of 
nationality only developed in the late Qing dynasty.  Chow states, “Chinese intellectuals looked 
to language, custom, history, and religion for the common bond of a nation. They found none”.19  
Consequently, the concept of hanzu, or “people of Han lineage”, was artificially created by anti-
Manchu scholars to attack the Qing dynasty.20  Influenced by the Western concept of “race”, 
these revolutionary scholars began to search for new identities for the Chinese nation in order to 
create a distinction between the ruling Manchus and the people.21  Since its creation, the concept 
of hanzu, which I will refer to as the “Han identity”, has been utilized for a number of political 
                                               
16 Sarah Cole. “Nationalism and Modernism”, MFS Modern Fiction Studies 48.2 (2002): 453.  
17 Josep R. Llobera. "Recent Theories of Nationalism." University College London Working Papers (1999): 3. 
18 Yingjie Guo. Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary China: The Search for National Identity Under Reform. 
London: Routledge, 2004.  
19 Kai-wing Chow, Kevin M. Doak, and Poshek Fu, eds. Constructing Nationhood in Modern East Asia. Ann Arbor: 
U of Michigan, 2001.  
20 Chow, Doak, and Fu, 75. 
21 Gladney, 180. 
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purposes, including resistance to the Japanese during the Guomindang’s rule.22  Thus, most 
authors view nationalism from the early 1900s to end of the Mao era in the 1970s as created by 
the state.23   
However, although national identity in China is inherently a modern construct, the 
dynamics of nationalism have evolved over time.  For example, popular nationalism, which is 
Han based but receives support from minorities as well, supports the idea that national identity 
can originate from the people, as posited by the primordialist theory.24  In fact, Gries argues that 
the emergence of this popular nationalism has become a threat to the government, resulting in the 
formation of “pragmatic nationalism” in recent years.25  Guo also notes that cultural nationalism, 
though primordialist nature, is often an extension of state nationalism in China, which is 
inherently modernist.26  Thus, the lines between primordialist and modernist thought are blurred 
in the analysis of contemporary Chinese nationalism, requiring one to gain a more nuanced 
understanding of whether nationalism is a top-down or bottom-up phenomenon. 
The following four categories of nationalism are selected for examination: state 
nationalism, Han nationalism, popular nationalism, and pragmatic nationalism.  The analysis of 
music and nationalism requires examining these topics in depth, because each category sheds 
light on a unique aspect of Chinese national identity. Furthermore, although the four categories 
are distinct and seemingly unrelated, they should be viewed as a whole in order to understand the 
various mechanisms through which nationalism is constructed.  Thus, music is important in this 
framework because it has the potential to provide the bridge between these four categories of 
nationalism.  While the following sections will provide overviews into the four categories, the 
                                               
22 Davis, 130. 
23 Gladney 1994; Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim, eds. China's Quest for National Identity. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 
1993.; Chow, Doak, and Fu 2001. 
24 Peter Hays Gries. China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy. Berkeley: U of California, 2004.  
25 Gries, 116. 
26 Yingjie Guo, 53. 
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discussion section of this chapter will highlight the apparent distinctions between the theories 
and offer new insight into how music fits into these nationalist frameworks. 
   
State Nationalism 
One way of analyzing state nationalism is to examine the state’s cultural policies and 
their effects on national identity.  Enze Han presents a thorough analysis of state nationalism by 
distinguishing between three periods of “nation-building”: 1. The tolerant and pluralistic policies 
of the early years, 2. The cultural destruction and political repression of the Cultural Revolution, 
and 3. The return to a more pluralistic approach, but with significant limitations in today’s 
society.  
During the first stage, the CCP’s policies towards ethnic minorities were relatively 
inclusive.27  Although the CCP did not include a clause allowing ethnic minorities to pursue self-
determination in its constitution, minority languages were promoted and protected.  For example, 
Article 53 of the Common Program, the provisional constitution for the PRC passed in 1949, 
“guaranteed ethnic minorities the right to develop and use their native languages and scripts... 
and promised government assistance in those efforts”.28  In addition, the 1952 General Program 
for the Implementation of Regional Autonomy, the 1953 Election Law, and the PRC 
Constitution of 1954 all mandated proportional minority membership in legislative bodies, 
pledged that ethnic minorities would have the same rights as the Han majority, and banned 
discrimination based on ethnicity.29   
During the late 1960s, many of these policies were reversed.  Dittmer notes, “During the 
Cultural Revolution, radical factions of the CCP grew impatient with the slow pace in national 
                                               
27 Han, 50. 
28 Ibid, 52. 
29 Sujian Guo and Baogang Guo, 140. 
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integration”.30  Bilingual education for ethnic minorities was either stopped entirely or drastically 
curtailed in, ethnic minority organizations were disbanded, and passages dealing with minority 
autonomy in the Constitution were eliminated.31  Many autonomous units were dissolved and 
ethnic minority leaders were deposed, and often persecuted.32  Most importantly, the suffering 
caused by these policies created irreparable damage to the relations between the Han and ethnic 
minorities.33 
The return to more tolerant and pluralistic policies began after Mao’s death in 1976.34  
Members of the old minority elites were restored to their previous positions in government, legal 
reforms provided more institutionalized autonomy and rights for various ethnic minority groups, 
and bilingualism was once again permitted and promoted.35  In addition, affirmation action for 
minority students applying to university, exceptions to the one-child policy, and quotas for 
representation in the government were all instituted to ensure equality between ethnic minorities 
and the Han.36  In recent years, it appears as though the government not only accepts minorities, 
but intends to highlight China’s diversity on the international level through supporting initiatives 
such as creating films on ethnic minorities and developing ethnic tourism.37  
However, despite the many policies favoring minorities, many authors agree that these 
policies are only superficial attempts at promoting equality, and in effect, minorities continue to 
be marginalized in society.38  Some authors even criticize the Chinese government’s lack of 
proactive and effective policy as a deliberate neglect, because it is obvious that the laws 
                                               
30 Dittmer and Kim, 89. 
31 Davis, 45. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Han, 112. 
34 Ibid, 130. 
35 Ibid, 132. 
36 Joseph Tse-Hei Lee, Lida V. Nedilsky, and Siu-Keung Cheung, eds. China’s Rise to Power: Conceptions of State 
Governance. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 89. 
37 Clarissa S. Montefiore, "How China Distorts Its Minorities Through Propaganda."  
38 Suijian Guo and Baogang Guo 2008; Lee, Nedilsky, and Cheung 2012; Han 2013. 
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governing ethnic-minority cultural rights and political autonomy are becoming increasingly 
inadequate in the context of the rapid economic and social change in China.39  For example, 
although preferential university admission for minority students is still in place, the system 
through which the government would automatically assign jobs to university graduates is not.40  
Thus, ethnic minority students often find themselves at a disadvantage when competing with Han 
Chinese students for jobs that require substantial proficiency in Mandarin Chinese.41  In addition, 
with economic development focused in the urban centers where Han Chinese are the majority, 
more and more ethnic minority individuals, who are disproportionately male, have chosen to 
leave their villages for economic opportunities.42  This has ultimately threatened the survival of 
ethnic minority culture, because many of these men do not return to village life and instead 
choose to assimilate into the Han culture and way of living.43  
 
Han Nationalism 
As discussed previously, the concept of hanzu, or the “Han identity”, is undoubtedly 
artificial and highly politicized.  The CCP, like the Guomintang and the revolutionaries before 
them, has utilized the Han identity to create a sense of pride among people who supposedly share 
Han cultural values, and to gain support for their political agenda of unification.44  Thus, the 
boundaries between cultural nationalism and state nationalism are undoubtedly blurred because 
the two categories are closely related.45  However, whereas state nationalism focuses on policies 
directed at ethnic minorities, cultural nationalism focuses on the indirect subjugation of ethnic 
                                               
39 Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom. China in the 21st Century: What Everyone Needs to Know. New York, NY: Oxford UP, 
2010. 77. 
40 Ibid, 80. 
41 Ibid, 81. 
42 Yongnian Zheng. Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China: Modernization, Identity, and International 
Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999. 
43 Ibid. 
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minorities – for example, through the portrayal of the Han as superior, and the indirect pressures 
on ethnic minorities to assimilate.  From a broader perspective, the CCP has effectively 
combined cultural and state nationalism to create a new type of nationalism - Han nationalism.46   
From the beginning of the People’s Republic, the Han people have been celebrated by the 
Communist Party as the “vanguard of the people’s revolution”.47  For example, a cable issued by 
the Central Party Propaganda Office of the New China News Agency in 1949 stated, “The Han 
occupy the majority population of the country; moreover, the Han today are the major force in 
China’s revolution. Under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, the victory of China’s 
people’s democratic revolution mainly relied on the industry of the Han people”.48  In the Ethnic 
Identification Project, the Chinese government classified minority groups according to what 
historical development stage it considered them to have reached.  The Han majority group was 
classified as the one that had progressed furthest into the feudal stage, while other groups were 
labeled “primitive”, “slave”, or “feudal”.49  Though today, there are laws prohibiting the explicit 
discrimination of ethnic minorities, Han superiority is still asserted in implicit ways.  
In a subtler way, the policies of the CCP today assert the superiority of the Han by 
pressuring ethnic minorities to adopt the Han language and customs.  Many authors refer to the 
assimilation of ethnic minorities as “sinification”, or huanhua.50  Han notes, “Today, it is very 
hard for younger-generation ethnic-minority people to grow up in a monolingual environment. 
Mass media, modern communication channels, pop culture, and all the conveniences and 
excitements offered by contemporary Chinese society all require one, especially a young person, 
                                                                                                                                                       
44 Gladney, 188. 
45 Ibid, 180. 
46 Zheng, 214. 
47 Gladney, 181. 
48 Ibid, 182. 
49 Chow, 156. 
50 Gladney 1994; Han 2013. 
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to conform, acculturate, or assimilate into the majority Han language and culture”.51 Recent 
nation-building policies such as the prohibition of under 18 years-olds from praying at mosques 
and the banning of civil servants and students from fasting during the month of Ramadan are 
examples of even stronger measures taken to accelerate sinification.52  
Additionally, the dynamics of the Han identity under the CCP reflect the purposes of Han 
nationalism.  Gladney argues, “the identification of certain groups within China as ‘minorities’ 
and the recognition of the Han as a ‘unified’ majority played a fundamental role in forging a 
unified Chinese nation, because minorities were induced to follow the Han example”.53  Chow 
also notes the importance of the Han identity in politics.  He notes, “This myth [of a hanzu] also 
sustains a belief that there is a majority ethnic group that is running the government, therefore 
justifying domination over ‘minority ethnic groups’ such as the Tibetans and the Uighurs, who 
are ‘less civilized and advanced’”.54 However, Chow also points out that the Han identity “has 
allowed political leaders to hide conflicts and tensions between ethnic groups within the 
hanzu”.55 Therefore, Han identity is simultaneously inclusive and exclusive - reflecting the 
CCP’s desire to consolidate power in the “Han majority” and weaken the autonomy of ethnic 
minorities.  
 
Popular Nationalism 
Whereas state nationalism and Han nationalism focus on the dynamics of ethnic identity, 
popular nationalism and pragmatic nationalism focus on allegiance to the state.  In some ways, 
these differences can be demarcated as internal and external nationalism – where internal 
                                               
51 Han, 122. 
52 Emily Rauhala. "The Politics of Pop in China's Xinjiang Region." Time Magazine, 2014.  
53 Gladney, 185. 
54 Chow, Doak and Fu, 160. 
55 Chow, Doak and Fu, 160. 
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nationalism refers to how one ethnic group within a country perceives themselves in comparison 
to other ethnic groups, and external nationalism is how citizens of a country perceive themselves 
in relation to other countries.   
Although many Western scholars insist that Chinese nationalism has always been a top-
down phenomenon, it is clear that popular nationalism has been prevalent throughout modern 
Chinese history, and in fact, has defined much of its course.  The Boxer Rebellion in 1900, for 
example, was an uprising in northern China against the spread of Western and Japanese 
influence.56  Members of this group, known as Boxers, were peasants mainly from the Shandong 
province, which was struck by several instances of famine and flooding during the late 1800s.  In 
the 1890s, China had given territorial and commercial concessions in this area to several 
European nations, and the Boxers blamed their poor standard of living on the foreigners who 
were colonizing their country.  This rebellion, as one of the first instances in modern Chinese 
history where the masses united to protest against foreign imperialism, set the precedent for 
popular nationalism through the end of the 20th century and provided inspiration for other anti-
imperialist protests, such as the May Fourth Movement in 1919, where students protested the 
Chinese government's weak response to the Treaty of Versailles.57  In other words, the Boxer 
Rebellion and May Fourth Movement gave rise to the “victim narrative” that united the Chinese 
people with the idea that China needed to be strong in order to avoid being continually 
victimized by foreign powers. 
Since its creation, the CCP has relied upon popular nationalism to gain and maintain 
support.  In line with Marxist thought, much of their success in the Chinese Civil War came from 
their ability to appeal to the masses – indeed, the CCP positioned themselves as the “party of the 
                                               
56 C.X. George Wei and Xiaoyuan Liu, eds. Chinese Nationalism in Perspective: Historical and Recent Cases. 
Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2001.  
57 Ibid, 129. 
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people” with the goal to “liberate” the masses from oppression by the Guomindang and 
imperialist forces.58  However, after the 1949 “liberation” by the CCP, the lines between popular 
and state nationalism became difficult to distinguish.  Although the state dictated the goals of 
nationalism during this time, expressions of nationalism were as much influenced by the people 
as they were by the state.  Ultimately, the cult of personality achieved by Mao Zedong, combined 
with the lasting fervor of revolution, led to popular nationalism defined by fanaticism and 
xenophobia.59  
 The CCP continued to play a significant role in influencing popular nationalism even 
after Mao’s death. The anti-Japanese protests of 1996, 2005, and 2012, for example, all reflected 
the internalization of the victim narrative perpetuated by Jiang Zemin’s patriotic education 
campaign.60  Instead of emphasizing how China “stood up” to foreign aggressors during World 
War II as his predecessors did, Jiang Zemin supported a narrative that emphasized the 
victimization of the Chinese, especially by Japan.61  For example, Chinese textbooks emphasized 
Japan’s invasion of China, but it made no effort to inform Chinese students that postwar Japan 
was democratic and pacifist.62  This education has exacerbated existing Sino-Japanese tensions, 
causing disputes over the Diaoyu islands and other issues such as Yasukuni shrine visits to easily 
spark nationalist outbursts by the people.63 
 
  
                                               
58 Zheng, 115. 
59 Lei Ouyang Bryant. "Music, Memory, and Nostalgia: Collective Memories of Cultural Revolution Songs in 
Contemporary China." China Review 5.2 (2005): 151-75.  
60 Jianrong Zhu. "Japan's Role in the Rise of Chinese Nationalism: History and Prospects." East Asia's Haunted 
Present: Historical Memories and the Resurgence of Nationalism. London, England: Praeger, 2008. 180-89. 
61 Zheng Wang. "National Humiliation, History Education, and the Politics of Historical Memory: Patriotic 
Education Campaign in China." International Studies Quarterly 52.4 (2008): 783-806. 
62 Zhu, 185. 
63 Ibid. 
 13 
Pragmatic Nationalism 
 Popular nationalism, however, is not always beneficial for the state.  Just as the masses 
can rally behind anger towards the actions of foreign countries, they can also unite to express 
their dissatisfaction towards the state.  Both the Boxer Rebellion and May Fourth Movement, for 
example, expressed anger towards the Chinese government in addition to foreign countries.  In a 
more contemporary example, although the protests against Japan's claims over the Diaoyu 
islands were inherently anti-Japanese, protesters were also largely unsatisfied by the Chinese 
government’s response.  In fact, in the 1996 national bestseller China Can Say No, the authors 
maintain that “China has been too warm and accommodating towards Japan” and implicitly 
condemn the government for suppressing popular anti-Japanese protests.64   
Popular nationalism also appears to be undermining the state’s agency.  Gries states, “In 
China today, popular networks are challenging the state’s hegemony over nationalism, 
threatening to rupture the Chinese nation-state”.65  For example, in the midst of popular protests 
about the 1999 Belgrade bombing, 2001 spy plane collision, and more recent island disputes, 
Chinese leaders had no choice but to condemn foreign nations and adopt a hard-line approach to 
discerning who was “right” and who was “wrong”.66  As a result, the CCP recognized that 
nationalism could be a double-edged sword and began approaching nationalism in a more careful 
way, leading to what scholars such as Peter Gries and Suisheng Zhao call “pragmatic 
nationalism”.67 
Pragmatic nationalism is, in essence, reactive in nature.  It does not have a fixed, 
objectified, or defined content, and is not driven by any ideology, religion beliefs or other 
                                               
64 Peter Hays Gries. China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy. Berkeley: U of California, 2004. 
65 Ibid, 134. 
66 Ibid, 135. 
67 Gries 2004; Suisheng Zhao. A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism. Stanford, 
Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004. 
 14 
abstract ideas.68  Instead, it is an instrument of the state to bolster the faith of Chinese people and 
hold the country together during the period of rapid and turbulent transformation from a 
Communist to a post-Communist society.69  For example, in response to popular calls for the 
government to take a tough position against the United States and Japan, CCP leaders have 
mainly adopted a two-pronged strategy.70  On the one hand, they have tolerated and even 
encouraged the expression of popular nationalism to make their own policy positions more 
credible to the U.S. and Japan on issues involving China’s vital interests such as the sovereignty 
of Taiwan.71  On the other hand, the state has been very cautious to prevent the popular 
sentiment of Chinese people from getting out of hand and causing backlash in both domestic and 
foreign affairs.72  Thus, the CCP has maintained that nationalism must be "channeled" in its 
expressions, which has led to the restraining or even banning of popular anti-American and anti-
Japanese demonstrations.73  
 
Discussion 
It is apparent through the examination of these four types of nationalism that there is an 
obvious disconnect between state and Han nationalism, and popular and pragmatic nationalism.  
Each set presents one primordialist and one modernist theory on nationalism, but the basis of 
these two sets seem to be unevenly divided between anthropological and political theories.  
Specifically, discussions about state and Han nationalism tend to focus on national and ethnic 
identity, whereas discussions about popular and pragmatic nationalism tend to center on 
allegiance to the state and the sense of unity among the citizens of country.  The discussion about 
                                               
68 Gries, 140. 
69 Zhao, 130. 
70 Ibid, 154. 
71 Ibid, 155. 
72 Gries, 140. 
73 Zhao, 158. 
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folk music in China, however, may be related to all four types of nationalism.  For example, 
while music is a primary means of creating identity, it can also be used to create feelings of 
loyalty towards the state.  On the other hand, because the popularity of Chinese folk music has 
not spread overseas, its significance in the context of nationalism may be limited to its domestic 
influence, and thus it may play a greater role in internal nationalism than external nationalism.  
In the next section, the role of music, generally, in the discourse on nationalism will be 
discussed. 
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The Importance of Music in Nationalism 
 In examining the importance of music in nationalism, it is crucial to discuss two theories: 
ethnosymbolism and banal nationalism.  First, the primary argument of ethnosymbolism is that 
“the persisting features in the formation and continuity of national identities are myths, 
memories, values, traditions, and symbols”.74  From this perspective, music, as the medium 
through which the features in the formation and continuity of national identities is transmitted, is 
a particularly important aspect of nationalism.   
Folk music, however, can play contradictory roles in creating unified national identity.  
For example, Leoussi and Grosby state, “the appropriation of folk music often amounted to a 
straightforward extension of the policies of Communist regimes following World War II”.75  
However, the revival of traditional genres was sometimes “a direct response to nationalist 
tensions”, such as when Serbian folk epics accompanied by gusla became popular during the 
1990’s.76  This example directly relates to the dynamics of min’ge that will be discussed later in 
this thesis.  Whereas revolutionary songs reflected a “straightforward extension” of CCP policy, 
the ability of certain minority groups to preserve their traditional folk music can be seen through 
as ethnosymbolist lens as a form of resistance to Han nationalism.  Thus, music not only plays a 
significant role in the nation-building efforts of the Communist regimes, but also in the 
resistance of ethnic groups to assimilation.  
Furthermore, in ethnosymbolism, state-sponsored transformation of folk music is not a 
novel concept.  For instance, in Belgrade in the 1990’s, turbo-folk, a fusion of “orientalized” 
traditional folk melodies and techno-pop, was created as a “a flashy, escapist alternative to 
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Western pop and rock”.77  Just as turbo-folk “came to stand for conservative, nationalistic values, 
well attuned to, and promoted by, the Milosevic regime”78, the CCP’s transformation of min’ge 
may represent a new genre of music that promotes loyalty to the Communist Party and Han 
nationalism. 
 Banal nationalism does not focus on the features in the formation and continuity of 
national identities, but rather on the subliminal nature of national symbols.79  The term “banal 
nationalism”, coined by Michael Billig, refers to “the everyday representations of the nation 
which build an imagined sense of national solidarity and belonging amongst humans”.80  
Examples of banal nationalism include the presence of flags, sporting events, symbols on money, 
national songs.  Billig argues that power behind modern nationalism is its "hidden" nature, and 
because it remains largely unexamined and unchallenged, it has become the basis for powerful 
political movements, and for most political violence in the world today.81  Therefore, 
nationalistic songs, due to their popularity, accessibility, and prevalence at everyday events, are 
powerful mechanisms for states to promote their agendas.  
In this way, the continual presence of min’ge in state-sponsored concerts and on the 
China Central Television’s (CCTV) programs is likely very influential in promoting nationalism. 
Not only do concerts such as the Chinese New Years’ Gala amass over 700 million views 
annually, CCTV’s accessibility and popularity has enabled it to “unconsciously educate the 
Chinese people about their nation, the party, dominant ideologies, and current government 
policies”.82  The incorporation of nationalistic messages into min’ge could, therefore, be 
intentional.  Gorfinkel notes, “the creative packaging of political and ideological lessons, or the 
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masking of politics in popular entertainment, is thought to make propaganda more effective. By 
rendering audiences oblivious to their own indoctrination, the state reinforces among the public 
the efficacy of its governance”.83  Therefore, due to the “hidden nature” of its nationalistic 
elements and its popularity, min’ge could be another extension of the state’s cultural policies. 
 
 The theories of ethnosymbolism and banal nationalism give us a clearer picture of the 
role of music in promoting nationalism.  However, it is still unclear what the role of folk music, 
and specifically min’ge, in China’s nationalist framework is.  In order to answer this question in 
depth, the following chapters will be structured as follows: Chapter 2 will include an analysis of 
the nature of popular music from the 1930s to the 1990s in order to identify relevant trends.  
Chapter 3 will focus on the development of the specific type of folk song promoted by the CCP 
today, and introduce the concept of “cultural hegemony”.  Chapter 4 will discuss issues of 
representation and national identity that arise from the popularization of the min’ge genre.  
Finally, Chapter 5 will summarize the main findings of this paper, and place the findings within 
the broader context of Chinese nationalism and the importance of music in creating a national 
identity.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Chinese Music Trends from 1930s - 1990s 
 
Author Sue Tuohy states, “In twentieth-century China, much musical discourse takes no 
pains to hide music’s associations with political goals”.84  This musical-political connection has 
not been a recent development, but rather a persistent theme throughout the history of Chinese 
music.85  In fact, the oldest existing collection of Chinese poetry, Shijing (Book of Songs), 
divided music according to states, and it is believed that Confucius could discern a state’s 
character by hearing its music.86  
For the purposes of this chapter, I begin my inquiry with the onset of the Second Sino-
Japanese War, due to its significance in creating new types of music that were distinctly 
Westernized and nationalistic.  I will then outline important historical events from the 
establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 to the 1990s, and describe the musical 
trends that resulted from the dramatic changes in the political environment.  Although there have 
been many significant developments in Chinese music since the 1930s, I will focus on the trends 
that have influenced popular music and folk music, and explore certain intersections between the 
two genres.  Additionally, because the type of minge analyzed in this thesis pertains mainly to 
vocal music, there will be a particular emphasis on trends in vocal music, as opposed to 
instrumental music.  
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Music of the 1930s – 1950s 
 In 1937, the Second Sino-Japanese War began, disrupting many elements of society, 
including the arts.87  Music began to be even more heavily politicized, and many pieces were 
composed solely to unite people in the war efforts against the Japanese.88  Additionally, 
composers of these nationalist songs, such as Nie Er, Xian Xinghai, and Zhao Yuanren, were 
deeply influenced by Western music and developed new types of musical compositions that 
incorporated Western elements.89   
However, the war was not the only impetus for change.  The nationalist songs at the time 
reflected the desire for cultural and political reform that had began since the May Fourth 
Movement in 1911.90  During this time, intellectuals revered Western ideals and many studied 
abroad in Europe, America, or Japan, including the famous composers Xian Xinghai and Zhao 
Yuanren.91  This altered the form of music in China, as well as the content.  Before, songs were 
often descriptive or narrative in nature, but after the concept of nationalism was imported to 
China, many composers focused their work on the fate of the country, and patriotism was an 
essential element of popular music.92  Author Wai-Chung Ho goes as far to say, “music was 
determined not by musical quality but by its political intention”.93  
One important musical trend that was a direct product of this politicization of music was 
the Mass Singing Movement.94  The socio-political movements of the 1930s required music to 
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mobilize the masses against a common enemy, but there were no preexisting Chinese musical 
forms that would achieve this purpose.95  Thus, composers began to develop a new type of vocal 
music that would be “taken up by the people”, based upon marching songs from the West.96  
Musicians and educators also formed small groups such as “Singing for Resistance against 
Japan” and the “National Salvation Movement” to promote the revolutionary spirit.97  Ho notes, 
“In Shanghai alone, twenty formal music organizations were formed, which initiated Mass 
Singing Societies to lift the national spirit in schools and in the countryside”.98  Li Baochen, a 
major organizer of the mass singing movement, noted the movement’s impact:  
“Not very long ago, the Chinese people thought that singing in public gatherings was 
either childish or undignified.  The new war songs, however, brought a new 
understanding of group-singing; they became a real stimulation of patriotism in their 
expression of youthfulness and cooperation.  Governmental officials actually opened 
their mouths in singing the National Anthem in meetings, and old people gradually 
caught on to the spirit and joy of singing with their grand children at home. China 
became group-singing conscious”99 
 
The success of the Mass Singing Movement reinforced the idea that music could 
effectively serve political purposes, and thus both Nationalists (Guomindang) and Communists 
utilized music to further their own campaigns.100  In the New Life Movement, launched by the 
Nationalist government in early 1934, songs were used to teach people about the concept of a 
“nation” and urged citizens to cultivate their moral character.101  Five years later, in the National 
Spiritual Mobilization Movement, mass singing was used as a means to rally people behind the 
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Nationalist government.102  The national anthem adopted by the Guomindang during this time 
reflects the new spirit of patriotism that these massing singing campaigns promoted.  Its lyrics 
state: 
San Min Chu-I (Three Principles of the People), 
Our aim shall be: 
To found a free land, 
World peace, be our stand. 
Lead on, comrades, 
Vanguards ye are. 
Hold fast your aim, 
By sun and star. 
Be earnest and brave, 
Your country to save, 
One heart, one soul, 
One mind, one goal...103 
 
Similarly, during the Long March (1934-1935), the Communist Party and People's 
Liberation Army used song, drama, and dance to appeal to the rural peasant population.104  In 
1929, Mao Zedong called for the formal inclusion of revolutionary songs in soldiers’ training 
programs, and a committee was established to “produce appropriate songs”.105  The Lu Xun Arts 
Academy established in 1938, in particular, focused on revising local folk music with new 
ideological content, and organized musical companies of all types to popularize this new type of 
Communist music.106  
However, Mao not only emphasized music as a means for revolution, but also took great 
importance in defining the characteristics and purpose of “revolutionary music”.107  At the 1942 
Yan’an Forum, held at the city of Yan’an in Communist-controlled China, Mao dedicated an 
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entire segment to describing the role of literature and art in the country.108  Specifically, Mao’s 
intent was to “ensure that literature and art fit well into the whole revolutionary machine as a 
component part, that they operate as powerful weapons for uniting and educating the people and 
for attacking and destroying the enemy, and that they help the people fight the enemy with one 
heart and one mind”.109  Because of its long-lasting influence on Chinese music, the following 
section will explore the Yan’an Forum in detail. 
 
The Yan’an Forum on Literature and Art 
From the beginning, Mao recognized the importance of the arts in promoting 
revolution.110  He stated, “Writers and artists… produce works which awaken the masses, fire 
them with enthusiasm and impel them to unite and struggle to transform their environment”.111  
Because literature and the arts were important in both instilling a sense of revolution and creating 
a sense of unity among revolutionaries, Mao wanted to ensure that they followed the “correct 
path of development”.112  From his standpoint, literature and art could only support his goals of 
overthrowing the Guomindang and attaining national liberation for China if they: 1) focused on 
workers, peasants, and soldiers as their primary audience; and 2) served the advancement of 
Marxism.113  In other words, author Liu Jingzhi notes, “literature and art were subordinate to 
politics”.114  
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Mao’s first decree was that writers and artists should know their audience and understand 
the “language of the masses”.115  Because workers, peasants, soldiers and urban petty 
bourgeoisie made up the largest section of the population, Mao believed that literature and the 
arts should be exclusively tailored to these groups of people.116  He stated: 
“Our literature and art are first for the workers, the class that leads the revolution.  
Secondly, they are for the peasants, the most numerous and most steadfast of our allies in 
the revolution.  Thirdly, they are for the armed workers and peasants… which are the 
main forces of the revolutionary war.  Fourthly, they are for the laboring masses of the 
urban petty bourgeoisie and for the petty-bourgeois intellectuals, both of whom are also 
our allies in the revolution and capable of long-term co-operation with us”.117   
 
Furthermore, he implored writers and artists to think of ways to educate the people 
because much of the population was illiterate.118  He also criticized writers and artists for being 
aloof from the masses and urged them to engage in self reflection, stating, “prior to the task of 
educating the workers, peasants, and soldiers is the task of learning from them”.119   
The second defining characteristic of revolutionary literature and art according to Mao 
was the adherence to Marxist principles.  Because promoting Marxist ideas required a thorough 
understanding of Marxism and society, he stated, “It is right for writers and artists to study 
literary and artistic creation, but the science of Marxism-Leninism must be studied by all 
revolutionaries, writers and artists not excepted”.120  Specifically, Mao insisted that writers and 
artists study the various classes in society, their mutual relations and respective conditions in 
order to produce literature and art that is “rich in content and correct in orientation”.121  Although 
he was particularly critical of Chinese opera because it was a courtly art form, he encouraged 
artists to draw from China's artistic legacy as well as international art forms in order to further 
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socialism.122  He stated, “We must take over all the fine things in our literary and artistic 
heritage, critically assimilate whatever is beneficial, and use them as examples when we create 
works out of the literary and artistic raw materials in the life of the people of our own time and 
place”.123 
The third issue that Mao addressed was the debate between popularization and raising the 
standard of the arts.124  Mao insisted that these two goals were intertwined, and that improving 
the quality of the arts was not possible without it appealing to the masses.125  Because the 
workers, peasants, and soldiers set the “basis from which to raise”, Mao argued that it was 
imperative for artists and writers to first learn from these groups of people before raising the 
standard of the arts.126  In Mao’s opinion, improving the arts meant “raising the level of literature 
and art in the direction in which the workers, peasants and soldiers are themselves advancing”.127  
Additionally, he noted that because these groups of people had not been properly educated and 
were engaged in fighting for liberation, the popularization of revolutionary arts was much more 
important than raising the standards of the arts.128  Moreover, he added that popularization would 
not be a hindrance to the development of the arts, because “the work of popularization… 
prepares the necessary conditions for us to raise standards in the future on a much broader 
scale”.129   
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One immediate change in Chinese music that resulted from the Yan'an Forum was a 
growth in the respectability of folk styles.130  In fact, after the Forum, a large-scale campaign was 
implemented in the Communist-controlled areas to educate the largely illiterate rural population 
in Communist ideology by means of folk tunes set to revolutionary words.131  These altered folk 
songs became known as hong’ge, or red songs, for their revolutionary content.  One such song 
was “Without the Communist Party, There Would Be No New China” (“Meiyou gongchandang 
jiu meiyou xin zhongguo”).  Written in 1943, its lyrics state: 
Without the Communist Party, There Will Be No New China. 
Without the Communist Party, There Will Be No New China. 
The Communist Party toiled for the nation. 
The Communist Party of one mind saved China 
It pointed to the road of liberation for the people. 
It led China towards the light. 
It supported the War of Resistance for more than eight years. 
It has improved people's lives. 
It built a base behind enemy lines. 
It practiced democracy, bringing many advantages. 
Without the Communist Party, there will be no new China. 
Without the Communist Party, there will be no new China132 
 
Clearly, “Without the Communist Party, There Would Be No New China” reflects the 
deeply political sentiments of revolutionary music.  In the bigger picture, the idea that literature 
and the arts were integral parts of the “revolutionary machine” became even more important after 
the foundation of the People’s Republic of China on October 1, 1949.133  It came to be 
understood that folk, popular, and revolutionary music were essentially the same genre, and the 
only genre of music permitted.134 Additionally, because the Communist Party was more 
interested in popularizing music than improving its quality, the development of new musical 
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forms in the Communist-controlled areas was stalled, and music did not move beyond the level 
of basic school songs for a long period of time.135  However, although Mao’s Talks at Yan’an set 
the precedent for government control of the arts, the onset of the Cultural Revolution ensured 
that any remaining degree of freedom in the arts was stifled.136 
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Music of the 1960s – 1970s  
The music from the 1960s to the 1970s was almost entirely influenced by the Cultural 
Revolution.137  The Cultural Revolution was a sociopolitical movement that took place from 
1966 to 1976, with the goal to purge remnants of capitalist and traditional elements from Chinese 
society, and re-impose Maoist thought as the dominant ideology within the Party.138  Many 
believe that Mao instigated the Cultural Revolution because he was losing political power, and 
his need to regain authority extended beyond politics to all aspects of life, including music.139  
During these ten years, all works of literature or art that did not fit in with the political aims or 
suit the tastes of Mao and his wife Jiang Qing were repudiated and destroyed.140  Liu states, 
“Literature and art shifted from serving the Party to serving Mao and Jiang, and from being a 
means for the Party to enforce obedience they became a means for Mao and Jiang to enforce 
obedience”.141  
One of the most well-known pieces created during the early 1960s was “The East is Red” 
(“Dong fang hong”).142  Produced in 1963 to celebrate the 15th anniversary of the People’s 
Republic of China, the musical film retells the history of the Chinese Communist Party from its 
founding in 1921 to its victory over the Nationalists in 1949.143  It was directed by Wang Ping, 
one of the few female music directors during this period, and was an epic song and dance 
production, involving over 3,000 workers, students, and peasants.144  The film became a 
cornerstone of Mao’s cult of personality, and its title song, also called “The East is Red”, became 
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the unofficial national anthem during the Cultural Revolution.145  The song was based on a 
northern Shaanxi folk song, but given new words that compared Mao to the sun in the heaven.146 
The lyrics state: 
The east is red, the sun is rising. 
From China comes Mao Zedong. 
He strives for the people's happiness, 
Hurrah, he is the people's great saviour! 
 
Chairman Mao loves the people, 
He is our guide 
to building a new China 
Hurrah, lead us forward! 
 
The Communist Party is like the sun, 
Wherever it shines, it is bright 
Wherever the Communist Party is 
Hurrah, the people are liberated!147   
 
Today, many people still think of Dong fang hong as one of the most popular and 
influential musical productions from the 1960s.148  At the time, it was the model from which 
many later revolutionary pieces were composed.149 
 After the onset of the Cultural Revolution, Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing, gained tremendous 
power over the arts.150  In 1966, she convened a Forum of Literature and Art Work in the Armed 
Forces.151  At the forum, it was decided that the People’s Liberation Army would play a decisive 
role in any socialist cultural revolution, and the re-education of cultural cadres was prioritized.152 
Zhou Yang, the cadre in charge of cultural affairs at the time, was forced out of power by Jiang, 
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who claimed that his cultural policy was a “black revisionist line”.153  More importantly, the 
forum “signaled the end of 17 years of work in literature and art since the founding of the PRC, 
and the beginning of Jiang Qing’s ‘revolutionary yangbanxi’”.154 
Although Mao banned traditional Peking opera as "feudalistic and bourgeois”, he 
recognized its popularity among the people and sought to reform the genre to suit his 
revolutionary goals.155  Thus, while traditional styles of singing, music, accompaniments, 
costumes and gestures were preserved, Jiang Qing rewrote the plots and dialogue of traditional 
operas and added Western symphonic instruments to enhance the dramatic development of the 
stories.156  This led to the development of yangbanxi, which were operas and ballets produced 
during the Cultural Revolution that told stories from China's revolutionary struggles against 
foreign and class enemies.157  During the Cultural Revolution, eight yangbanxi provided the only 
source of entertainment for entire population.158  This led to the joke, "Eight hundred million 
people watched eight shows" (“Ba yi ren kan ba ge xi”).159   
In creating yangbanxi, Mao and the Gang of Four demonstrated their pragmatism through 
exploiting all works of art that could work to their advantage and eradicating any which were 
damaging or useless to them.160  Along these lines of pragmatism, almost all music during the 
Cultural Revolution was vocal music, because Jiang Qing believed that instrumental music was 
difficult to utilize as a propaganda tool.161  As such, composers began inserting lyrics into ballets 
and symphonies such as “Hongse niangzijun” (“Red detachment of women”) and 
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“Shajiabang”.162  Even the Yellow River concerto, the only truly instrumental piece promoted at 
the time, had subtitles which exhorted the audience to “Raise high the great red banner of 
Marxism, Leninism, and Mao Zedong Thought and advance fearlessly”.163  Sayings of Mao set 
to music, known as quotation songs, were also very popular from the start of the Cultural 
Revolution in 1966 until 1969.164  These, along with other songs glorifying the Communist Party 
and Cultural Revolution, contributed to revolutionary frenzy of the time period and reinforced 
Mao’s cult of personality.165  
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Music from the 1970s-1990s 
In the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, a strong emphasis was given to redefining the 
role and direction of the arts.166  In successive meetings and conferences, cultural leaders 
criticized the mistakes of the past and suggested models for musical reconstruction.167  The 
necessity for art to be in line with politics was reiterated, but new leaders such as Deng Xiaoping 
and Hu Yaobang encouraged music workers to “build on the traditional legacy of the Chinese 
civilization” and incorporate foreign elements that would be helpful to the development of 
Chinese music.168  The Central Committee also met with music educators and composers to 
correct the “unsophisticated singing styles” of the performers during the previous two decades 
and eliminated songs that merely promoted slogans from the Cultural Revolution.169  Music 
textbooks and anthologies were revised to “reflect the new period”.170  Finally, Mao’s 
prioritization of state goals over the arts was repudiated, and the government slowly began to 
support raising the quality of the arts.171  
One of the defining characteristics of this post-Cultural Revolution period was the ability 
for composers to express their individuality.172  In what Liu calls the “New Wave” period, the 
ability for free creation and self-expression was monumental, because individuality was 
consistently criticized and punished from the 1940s to the 1970s.173  However, although 
composers embraced freedom of expression and Western influences in their music, many were 
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still influenced by Mao’s legacy.174  In fact, setting Mao’s poems to music was a popular activity 
even after the Cultural Revolution, and many works from notable composers such as Zheng 
Lücheng, and Tian Feng were inspired by Mao’s words.175   
It was not until the announcement of Deng Xiaoping’s Open Door Policy in 1978 that 
China’s popular music began to develop in a direction free from politics and cater to a younger 
generation.176  As a result of Deng’s Open Door Policy, the economy grew at an average annual 
rate of 10.5 percent from 1979 to 1994, and many coastal cities such as Guangzhou and Shanghai 
underwent rapid development.177  This economic growth transformed the music industry, 
because young people in the cities could now afford to buy recording and pay for concerts.178  
The import of foreign technology and the consequent availability of modern domestic and 
personal media appliances such as radios, cassette players, and television sets also accelerated 
the development of popular music.179  
In addition to foreign genres, young people became enamored by popular music from 
Hong Kong and Taiwan, known as Gangtaiyue.180  Gangtaiyue had smooth flowing melodies 
that were neither fully Chinese nor fully Western, and a light disco dance rhythm with high-
pitched vocals reminiscent of Chinese folk song styles.181  Because music in Hong Kong and 
Taiwan was not as strictly controlled by their respective governments, composers were able to 
write with much more freedom.182  Liu asserts, “In Taiwan and Hong Kong, the environment for 
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both music creation and research has been freer than in Mainland China”.183  Thus, composers 
were able to write music dealing with taboo subjects such as love, which allowed Gangtaiyue to 
become immensely popular among the younger generations.  Singers like Deng Lijun (also 
known as Teresa Teng) also stimulated the growth of an underground popular music scene in 
China.184  
Not surprisingly, Gangtaiyue was criticized for being too Westernized, and the 
government was wary about Gangtaiyue’s role in the new youth culture.185  Additionally, 
although most popular songs during the 1980s were nationalistic in nature, they did not 
necessarily support the government.186  For example, Hou Dejian’s “The Descendants of the 
Dragon” (“Long De Chuanren”) was an iconic song during this period of time, and it became 
one of the anthems for the student protests on Tiananmen in 1989.187  Its lyrics state: 
In the Far East there is a river, its name is the Yangtze River 
In the Far East there is a river, its name is the Yellow River 
In the Ancient East there is a dragon, her name is China 
In the Ancient East there is a people, they are all the heirs of the dragon 
I grew up under the claw of the dragon, after I grew up I became an heir of the dragon 
Black eyes, black hair, yellow skin, forever and ever an heir of the dragon 
 
In the Far East there is a river, its name is the Yangtze River 
In the Far East there is a river, its name is the Yellow River 
Although I’ve never seen the beauty of the Yangtze, in my dreams I miraculously travel 
the Yangtze’s waters 
Although I’ve never heard the strength of the Yellow River, the rushing and surging 
waters are in my dreams 
 
A quiet night a hundred years ago, the deep dark night before a revolution 
The sound of guns and cannons broke the silent night; surrounded on all sides by the 
appeasers’ swords 
How many years do the cannons ring out, how many years and how many more 
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Great dragon, great dragon, rub your eyes and awaken; rub your eyes and awaken 
forever188 
 
It is clear that the racial nationalism promoted in the song through lines such as “Black 
eyes, black hair, yellow skin, forever and ever an heir of the dragon” is different from the state 
nationalism promoted by revolutionary songs.  Therefore, although the CCP did not ban these 
songs from mainstream media, it did not support them either.189 
Another genre of nationalistic pop music that became quite influential in the mid-1980s is 
Xibeifeng.190  Xibeifeng adapted folk song melodies from the northwestern part of China to pop 
accompaniment developed in Hong Kong and Taiwan.191  These folk songs used a Western-style 
fast tempo, strong beat, and forceful bass lines, but also included Chinese traditional 
instruments.192  In contrast to Canto-pop, Xibeifeng songs were sung loudly and forcefully, and 
this rough vocal style gained popularity because of its folk roots.193  In fact, the rise of Xibeifeng 
was aided by the Xungen (seeking roots) movement that began in the late 1980s.  This cultural 
and literary movement in mainland China celebrated local and minority cultures, and strived to 
preserve the Chinese identity against the flood of foreign cultural influence.194   
However, although Xibeifeng songs’ revolved around nationalistic content, such as the 
Long March and scenes from the countryside, this genre also gave rise to Chinese rock and roll, 
or yaogun yinyue, which became a means of protest against the government.195  For example, Cui 
Jian, considered the father of Chinese rock and roll and a leading figure in the Xibeifeng genre, 
was often banned by the government because his music and political lyrics were thought to 
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present a bad example to young people.196  His song, “Nothing to My Name”, tells the story of a 
poor boy pleading with his girlfriend to accept his love though he has nothing, but also 
symbolizes the feelings of disillusionment and dispossession that were present among the 
younger generations at the time.  Its lyrics state: 
I have asked endlessly, 
when will you go with me? 
But you always laugh at me, for having nothing to my name. 
 
I want to give you my dreams [goals], 
and my freedom, 
but you always laugh at me, for having nothing. 
 
Oh! When will you go with me? 
Oh! When will you go with me? 
 
The ground beneath my feet is moving, 
the water by my side is flowing, 
but you always laugh at me, for having nothing. 
 
Why is your laughter never enough? 
[Why does your laughter never end?] 
Why do I always have to chase you? 
Could it be that in front of you 
I forever have nothing to my name. 
 
Oh! When will you go with me? 
Oh! When will you go with me? 
 
I tell you I’ve waited a long time, 
I give you my final request, 
I want to take your hands, 
and then you’ll go with me. 
 
This time your hands are trembling, 
this time your tears are flowing. 
Could it be that you’re telling me, 
you love me with nothing to my name? 
 
Oh! Now you will go with me!197 
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Because of its double-meaning, “I Have Nothing” became another student anthem at the 
time of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests.198  Although the rock music was briefly banned 
after the protests, rock and roll continued to function as a means for the younger generation to 
express their discontent towards government repression.  Jones states, “with their “disturbing” 
hairstyles and costumes such as long hair, torn up jeans, gothic style silver metal ornaments and 
black leather jackets, rock artists represented a non-conformist attitude and were welcomed by 
the youth who wanted a change from the uniform and state-controlled culture.199  Thus, the 
popularity of rock groups continued to increase during the late 1980s, and by the 1990s, there 
were three rock bands with large followings: Huxi (Breathing), Cobra, and Zang Tianshuo.200   
The true demise of Chinese rock was spurred by economic reasons.201  In 1992, Deng 
Xiaoping made his Southern Tour to Shenzhen and other cities to defend his Open Door 
Policy.202  As the economy once again embraced market-based reforms, the music industry 
became increasingly commercialized.203  Canto-pop and other forms of popular music that had a 
wider public appeal and fewer government restrictions became more attractive investments to 
record companies than rock music.204  Thus, Canto-pop regained its popularity while rock music 
quickly became isolated from mainstream popular culture.205 This downfall of rock music caused 
some rock artists such as Tian Zhen and Xu Wei to adopt the Canto-pop style and achieve 
commercial success, to the disappointment of other artists like He Yong, who desired to keep the 
integrity and spirit of Chinese rock.206 
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During the 1990s, it seemed as if the government was losing control of the growing 
popularity of western popular music styles.207  For example, many foreign artists held concerts in 
China for the first time and international music festivals, such as the Beijing Jazz Festival, were 
inaugurated.208  In addition, foreign record companies began to expand into Chinese markets in 
the 1990s, and many popular singers such as Na Ying and Liu Huan signed contracts with 
companies such as EMI and Sony.209  Thus, the government began to think of ways to counter 
the internationalism of popular music in China by reinforcing its nationalistic policies.  In 1994, 
the CCP Propaganda Department issued the “Fundamental Principles on Implementing a 
Patriotic Education”, which endorsed traditional Chinese customs and Confucian values.210  The 
Patriotic Education Campaign also renewed emphasis on patriotic songs as a means to unite 
China’s people under the concept of “one China”.211  As a result, revolutionary songs, or 
hong’ge, from before 1949 were revised and popularized in the 1990s.212  Classic Maoist 
revolutionary songs were reworked with R&B and reggae rhythms, and “The East is Red” was 
even rewritten with disco beats.213  Although this new style of hong’ge never achieved the same 
popularity as Canto-pop or rock, they nonetheless were successful in reviving revolutionary 
songs that been marginalized by the Westernization of popular music.214  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Exploring Traditional and Contemporary Min’ge 
 
 
Although min’ge translates directly as “folk songs”, the term itself does not represent the 
entire spectrum of folk songs in China.  In both music research and education, traditional min’ge 
is usually separated into two categories: shaoshu minzu min’ge (ethnic minority folk songs), and 
hanzu min’ge (Han folk songs).215  However, these distinctions are semantically problematic – 
besides ethnic differences, there are many layers of regional and stylistic differences that are not 
reflected in these broad categories.216  Additionally, I argue that due to the commercialization 
and modernization of traditional music, as well as the impact of certain government policies, a 
third category of contemporary min’ge has emerged.  More importantly, the creation, 
performance, and popularization of contemporary min’ge reflects the cultural hegemony of the 
Chinese Communist Party and Han majority.  This cultural hegemony, derived from the ability to 
manipulate cultural products, leads to issues of representation and national identity which will be 
explored in the next chapter. 
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Traditional Folk Music 
Definitions 
 First, before comparing traditional and contemporary min’ge styles, it is important to 
define the scope of “folk music” in this analysis and discuss its unifying characteristics.  While it 
is agreed upon that folk music originates from the masses, scholars often debate the degree to 
which folk music can be changed without losing its traditional identity.217  For example, Rachel 
Harris defines traditional folk music as “unwritten oral traditions”, but also acknowledges that 
the genre of folk music has changed significantly since the importation of musical notation and 
recording devices.218  Additionally, Baranovitch highlights that there have been even greater 
changes as a result of the commodification of folk songs.219  However, while both Harris and 
Baranovitch view these changes as threatening to the traditional value of folk music, Mackerras 
regards these changes as natural.  He asserts, “Folk songs, like other performing art forms, are a 
developing tradition and consequently subject to change”.220  
 While acknowledging the inevitable changes in music composition, I will define 
traditional folk music as songs free of political influence, originating from and created for the 
people of which the music is supposed to represent.  Although the categories of “traditional” and 
“contemporary” imply temporal distinctions, it is impossible to assign a given time period to 
each category, because traditional folk music can still be composed today.221  Thus, “traditional” 
is more synonymous with “original”, and “contemporary” can be thought of as deviating from 
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the original form.  However, it is important to note that many songs of the min’ge style 
composed after 1942 will not be considered traditional min’ge for the purposes of this analysis.  I 
highlight 1942 as the pivotal year for folk music, because, as mentioned in Chapter 2, the Yan’an 
Talks inspired many changes – one of which included the assignment of composers to the 
countryside to learn about folk melodies and rewrite folk songs with revolutionary lyrics.  In 
addition, after the Yan’an Talks, revolutionary music, or hong’ge, became the only acceptable 
form of music, causing many genres of music, including folk music and Western classical styles, 
to be assimilated into this category.222  
 
Unique Characteristics 
In traditional min’ge, there are many layers of diversity.  For example, although the label 
of “Han” implies a unity of folk customs, Han folk songs can be separated into eleven different 
“culture areas”: the Northeastern Plain, Northwestern Plain, Jing Huai Plateau (northern Jiangsu 
and northern Anhui), Jiang Zhe Plain (south Jiangsu), southern Anhui, Zhejiang, Min Tai (Fujian 
and Taiwan), Yue (Guangdong), Jiang Han Plain (Hubei, southern Henan), Xiang (Hunan), Gan 
(Jiangxi), Southwestern Plateau, and Kejia (Hakka people of various places).  These “culture 
areas” differ in not only their geographic locations, but also their customs, dialects, and musical 
traditions.223   
The diversity of the shaoshu minzu min’ge is even greater.  Even though it is well known 
that each of the 55 minorities preserves its own characteristic local music, there are many types 
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of folk songs not accounted for.224  In fact, Chinese musicologists often divide the folk songs of 
each minority into several categories.225  For example, there are nine representative types of 
Mongolian folk songs that are often divided into the broader categories “long songs” (chang 
diao) and “short songs” (duan diao), depending on their function, tempo, lyrical content, and 
accompanying instruments.226   
Besides the divisions within Han min’ge and ethnic minority min’ge, there are differences 
between the two categories in terms of instrumentation, tonality, vocal styles, and tempo.  For 
example, Mongolian folk songs are often accompanied by the horse-head fiddle, yoochin, and 
Khuuchir, whereas Han folk songs usually feature the suona, chuigushou and the luo (commonly 
known as a gong).227  The singing styles of each minority are also very different.  Uyghur folk 
songs, for instance, have many ornamentations in the melodic line, whereas Han folk songs, such 
as mountain songs (shan’ge), have much more straightforward melodies.228  The tempo of 
traditional folk songs also varies significantly – whereas some are not metered, like the “long 
songs” of Mongolian origin, others, like the Uyghur sanam, feature percussive instruments that 
play complex rhythms.229  Traditional folk songs also have unique tonality – for example, 
Mongolian throat singing, or Khoomei, is a type of overtone singing, where the performer 
produces a fundamental pitch and simultaneously adds one or more pitches over the first pitch.230  
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Preservation and Influence 
Unfortunately, the preservation of these songs has been difficult.  Folk music, along with 
many other types of music mentioned in Chapter 2, suffered many negative consequences from 
the Cultural Revolution.  For instance, the singing of folk songs was forbidden and many 
talented singers were persecuted.231  Those who collected folk music were also under attack 
because folk songs were considered traditional elements of society to be eradicated.232  Today, 
many of the elderly who would potentially be capable of passing on these folk song traditions, 
are too traumatized from the Cultural Revolution to sing.233  Schimmelpenninck states, “In the 
Wu area234, many people are still afraid because of their past experiences and do not want to sing 
any more, certainly not in front of a microphone”.235   
Furthermore, the attitude towards folk music has changed, with both the younger and 
older generations considering folk songs to be obsolete in the dynamically modernizing world.236  
Young people who develop a professional interest in singing usually become students at urban 
conservatories or art schools, where an operatic and polished style of singing is taught, which has 
little in common with traditional rural performance styles.237  Many of the elderly also seem to 
have internalized the idea that traditional customs are no longer relevant, or even welcome, in the 
modern era.238  When elderly Wu singers were asked why they no longer perform their songs in 
the fields, they remarked, “We cannot do that. People would laugh at us; they would think us 
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mad”.239  This is a stark contrast from the prevalence of folk song singing before the Cultural 
Revolution, when singing folk songs were considered a part of daily life and a very important 
tradition of the villages.240  
 
These difficulties in the preservation of traditional min’ge and its declining influence has 
set the pretext for the emergence of contemporary min’ge.  Additionally, the diversity of 
traditional min’ge explored in this section will be contrasted to the homogenization of 
contemporary min’ge highlighted in the next section.  
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Contemporary Min’ge 
Development and Politicization before the Cultural Revolution 
In the beginning, contemporary min’ge was not political.  The first song to have 
Mandarin lyrics set to traditional minority folk music was “Dabancheng Girl” (“Dabancheng de 
guniang”), written in 1938 by Wang Luobin, a Han composer who gained a tremendous amount 
of fame for composing songs with in a Uyghur style.241  The lyrics, which are in Mandarin, 
describe the beauty of girls from Dabancheng, a city in the Xinjiang province.  The lyrics are as 
follows: 
Dabancheng girls have long plaits and two eyes so pretty. 
If you get married, don’t marry anyone else, you must marry me 
Bring along your wealth, and your little sister, come along on your horse-drawn cart!242 
 
Now considered a quintessential Uyghur folk song in many folk song anthologies in 
China, the song was most likely inspired by the Turkic carters who passed through Lanzhou, 
where Wang settled during the Second Sino-Japanese War.243  According to Harris, 
“Dabancheng Girl” was very popular among Chinese audiences in Lanzhou, where it was 
performed by Wang’s theater troupe, but there is no evidence that it became popular in other 
areas of China at that time.244  In fact, it is highly unlikely, due to the fact that Wang’s troupe 
performed only locally.245  
However, even though Wang’s music did not have a tremendous following at the time, 
his idea of writing Mandarin lyrics for traditional minority min’ge was echoed by many 
composers during the 1940s.  As Mao’s Talks at Yan’an were internalized and many composers 
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were sent to the countryside to “learn from the people”, a large amount of contemporary min’ge 
was created.246   
Unlike Wang’s initial songs, however, these new min’ge were explicitly political.  In fact, 
the only defining characteristic between these min’ge and other revolutionary types of music 
such as hong’ge was their use of minority folk tunes.247  For example, the song “The Sun in the 
Grassland Rises Never to Go Down” (“Caoyuan shang shengqi bu luo de taiyang”), written in 
1952 by Meili Qige, is often referred to as a “Mongolian folk song” due to its melodic lines, slow 
tempo and free rhythm that are characteristic of traditional Mongolian folk music.248  However, 
although Meili Qige was ethnically Mongolian, he wrote this piece in Mandarin for his students 
at Central Conservatory of Music in Beijing, and its main purpose is to extol Chairman Mao.249  
The lyrics state: 
White clouds float in the blue sky, under the white clouds horses gallop 
Waving whip sounds all around, a hundred birds hover together. 
 
If people ask me what place is that 
I proudly tell them: this is our home. 
 
People here love peace, and have deep love for their native land 
They sing about their new lives, they sing about the Communist Party. 
 
Chairman Mao, ah! The Communist Party! They are bringing us up to maturity 
The sun in the grassland rises never to go down…250 
 
This reflects the policy of “coming from the masses and going back to the masses” that 
was the basis of the creation of contemporary min’ge during the 1940s and 1960s.251  This mass-
line policy, in the context of music, essentially describes the process of taking melodic material 
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(folk melodies, tempos, singing styles, etc.) from the people, then giving it back to them in a new 
form that is “coordinated and systematized after careful study”.252  However, folk music was not 
only to be arranged and harmonized by professionally-trained musicians, but also sanitized in 
this process.  Hamm states, “Not incidentally, in the process it [folk music] was purged of 
ideologically incorrect associations – folk music’s connection with the “superstitions” of 
religious and pagan ritual, and Chinese classical music’s historical association with the 
privileged classes – and was offered in a new, ideologically correct environment”.253  This new 
type of min’ge was then popularized through performances by state ensembles, and publicized 
and praised by the state press to “encourage the masses to embrace this music as their own”.254  
 
Development after the Cultural Revolution 
While the trend of setting folk songs to revolutionary lyrics in Mandarin persisted 
throughout the 1940s to the 1960s, all remnants of folk culture were harshly banned by the 
government during the Cultural Revolution.255  However, after the Cultural Revolution, folk 
songs were slowly recovered and the content of contemporary min’ge began to shift away from 
the glorifying Mao.256  Instead, minority folk songs focusing on pastoral life, love, and women 
became extremely popular.257   
In 1982, the Minister of Culture, Huang Zhen, made a speech in the closing of the All-
China Minority Nationalities Performing Arts Festival that became the official source for policy 
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toward the performing arts of minority groups.258  His speech can be summarized into these five 
essential points:259 
1. The cultural cadres, folk, and other artists of the minority nationality performing arts 
who were suppressed by the gang of four should be reinstated. 
 
2. The minority nationalities should enjoy “full autonomy and power of initiative” in 
their performing arts, and “be the real masters in their own house of culture”. 
 
3. While variety in the arts should be encouraged, Party policy should be applied in all 
areas, with literature and arts being no exception.  
 
4. Cadres should work to build the cultural enterprises of the minority nationality areas 
and make sure remote areas are not left out. 
 
5. All performing arts work must aim to promote unity among the nationalities, 
including that among Han and minority workers in the performing arts, as well as that 
among the various minority nationalities themselves. 
 
Although these points seem to suggest a rather open policy towards minority arts, there 
are many contradictions which ultimately reinforce the cultural authority of the Party.  For 
example, while Huang encouraged minorities to be “the masters in their own house of culture”, 
he reinforces the fact that all literature and art is still subject to Party policy.  Furthermore, 
Huang’s instructions to “promote unity among the nationalities” are less heavy-handed than 
Mao’s requirement that all literature and art be “revolutionary”, but minority arts are still 
mandated to serve Party goals, which clearly limits their agency. 
While contemporary minority min’ge composed today avoids explicit glorification of the 
Party, they are not entirely apolitical.260  In fact, many contemporary folk songs that borrow 
ethnic min’ge styles have lyrics that carry implicit political messages.261  One example is the 
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song “Road to Heaven”, released in 2005 by half-Tibetan singer Han Hong.262  The song’s music 
video features video clips from the construction of the Beijing-Lhasa express train, and expresses 
the singer’s anticipation of the railroad reaching her hometown.263  The lyrics state: 
At dawn I stand in the fresh green meadow 
And find a sacred eagle carrying the morning rays on its wings 
Like an auspicious cloud flying across the sky 
To bring good fortune to the Tibetan peoples 
 
At dusk I stand high up on the hill 
To watch that railroad be built to my hometown 
Like dragons crossing the mountains one after another 
To bring welfare to the snow-capped plateau 
 
That’s a heavenly road of wonder ahh... 
To carry the warmth of the world to the border area 
Making mountains and roads no longer inaccessible 
And bringing the peoples together through laughter264 
 
Even though the song never directly mentions the CCP, the song glorifies one of the 
CCP’s projects, and thus indirectly praises the government’s policies.  Furthermore, in several 
lines of the song, the Beijing-Lhasa express train is portrayed as the savior of the Tibetan people.  
For example, the comparison between the train and “an auspicious cloud flying across the sky to 
bring good fortune to the Tibetan peoples”, and the reference to the train as “a heavenly road of 
wonder”, all serve to reinforce the image of gratitude from the Tibetan people towards the 
government.265 
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Commercialization and Modernization 
As explored in Chapter 2, economic growth during the 1980s transformed the music 
industry, and the commodification of music accelerated the development of popular music, as 
well as contemporary minority min’ge.266  Minority min’ge now had to compete with Gangtaiyue, 
and many composers exploited the “exotic” qualities of traditional minority folk music as 
economic capital.267  In fact, in a response to the flood of foreign influence after the Open Door 
Policy of 1978, many people were drawn to minority min’ge because it retained the authenticity 
that genres such as Gangtaiyue seemed to lack.268  Like the Xibeifeng songs of the mid-1980s, 
minority min’ge became even more popular during the Xungen movement because it represented 
a type of music that celebrated its cultural roots.269  
However, contemporary minority min’ge was also greatly influenced by the genres of 
pop and rock that became popular during the 1980s.270  For example, the song “I Want to Go to 
Tibet” (“Wo Xiang Qu Xizang”) that was popularized by Wulan Tuoya, a Mongolian min’ge 
singer, is an interesting crossover between min’ge and pop.271  Although the style of singing 
features a nasal tone and guttural ornamentations that are typical of traditional Tibetan and 
Mongolian folk songs, the song has an upbeat pop rhythm that reflects the importation of an 
entirely Western concept.272  The incorporation of this rhythm became commonplace among 
many minority themed songs during the early 2000s.273  In fact, the only elements of these new 
min’ge pop songs that allude traditional minority folk music is the use of certain traditional 
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singing techniques and lyrics emphasizing the allure of China’s periphery regions.274  In this 
particular song, the lyrics describe the singer’s admiration and longing for Tibet: 
Buddha's halo breaks endless bleakness, 
A chant sounds rejoicing and soothing. 
Early morning, I lift my wings of clouds 
Late in the evening, I crawl towards your Heaven.  
 
New life flows along the Yarlung Zangbo River, 
Memory stretches long in the Potala Palace 
The grand grassland is opening its arms 
To welcome me, a gentle sheep. 
 
I want to go to Tibet. 
I want to go to Tibet! 
To worship its grand snowy land,   
Beautiful scenery and lush green grass. 
The pasture in my heart is everywhere! 
 
I want to go to Tibet. 
I want to go to Tibet! 
To worship Samsara and Nirvana. 
In loneliness and long dark night, 
A Snow Lotus blossoms in my heart!275  
 
Parallel to the influence of pop and rock, Western classical styles also became 
commonplace in the composition of contemporary min’ge.276  Today, professional and amateur 
musicians alike will associate the term “min’ge” to a style that is a hybrid between traditional 
Han min’ge and Western classical styles.277  This style of min’ge belongs to a genre of music that 
Hamm refers to as “light music”, or what Liu categorizes as “New Music”.278  In Hamm’s 
analysis, light music encompasses “instrumental arrangements of Chinese traditional melodies, 
new pieces by Chinese composers based on similar melodic material, folk songs arranged for 
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voices with instrumental accompaniment, and recent vocal compositions drawing on elements of 
traditional Chinese style”.279  Although this music possesses traditional “Chinese” qualities, the 
melody is based on a pentatonic scale, and the songs usually feature a string-dominated ensemble 
including both Chinese and Western instruments.280   
Thus, this style is often seen as not entirely Chinese or Western.  One of the most 
“Chinese” elements of this type of min’ge, in fact, is its connection to hong’ge.281  Like the 
revolutionary songs developed in the 1920s and 1930s, many songs are fervently nationalistic 
and exult loyalty to the state.282  In “My Motherland”, for example, the chorus states:  
I love my country, I kiss my country, 
Kiss you with my warmest part of my heart,  
I love my motherland, I kiss my motherland,  
Loving you is my life’s sustenance283 
 
However, although these songs have origins from the early revolutionary songs, they are 
noticeably more sophisticated and complex.284  For example, most of these songs include both 
Western orchestras and traditional Chinese instruments as accompaniment, and feature Western-
influenced forms and harmonies, tempered tuning, virtuosic effects, fixed rhythmic 
interpretations, and melodic ornaments.285  The style of singing is also very refined – it features 
the nasal tone of traditional Han folk songs, but incorporates Western operatic techniques and 
tonality to create a fuller sound.286  
On the one hand, this reflects the greater importance placed on raising the quality of the 
arts after the Cultural Revolution, as explored in Chapter 2.  The adaptation of Western models 
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of harmony, intonation, and instrumentation can also be seen as attempt to “modernize” Chinese 
music, because Western music was seen as more modern and scientific than traditional Chinese 
music.287  Hamm notes, however, that this development was not unique, but followed a Soviet 
model.288  Chinese conservatories of music were reshaped in the 1950s according to the Russian 
system, and the Soviet model of large “folk” ensembles playing arrangements created by 
professional composers of traditional tunes became the example for many contemporary Han 
min’ge ensembles today.289  Nonetheless, this new “national music culture”, with contemporary 
Han min’ge as a center point, became essentially, “Chinese folk melodies + western professional 
techniques”.290   
On the other hand, the Westernization of min’ge may reflect the practical demands of the 
state.  The revolutionary songs of the 1920s and 1930s fell into disfavor among much of the 
Chinese population after 1978 because of their association with attitudes prevalent during the 
Cultural Revolution, and since then, the government has attempted to “repackage” these songs in 
order to maintain their appeal.291  The growing openness to foreign culture after the Open Door 
Policy also gave the Chinese population a chance to choose from among a much wider range of 
musical styles.292  Therefore, it is clear that contemporary min’ge is a practical adaptation of 
hong’ge, because the older genre is no longer capable of rousing and maintaining mass 
enthusiasm for the state.293   
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Societal Changes 
Besides the three trends in music mentioned thus far (modernization, commercialization, 
and politicization), there were also several societal changes that affected the min’ge genre 
significantly.  First, the professionalization of the performing artists drastically changed the 
development of minority folk music.294  Although minority artists were employed by 
professional companies since the Communist Party came to power, the emphasis on minority 
recruitment after 1975 contributed to significantly greater Han control over minority music.295  
Yang Mu notes that Zhou Enlai encouraged the Central Nationalities Song and Dance Troupe to 
have 50 percent representation from minority artists, but by 1984, the percentage had already 
reached 57 percent.296  Mackerras adds, “by its enthusiastic sponsorship of the mass arts of the 
minority nationalities, the CCP has been willing and able to control the type of arts revived and 
performed, to choose the artists, and to ensure the ideological suitability of anything that appears 
on stage”.297   
However, while some would argue that this Han influence is threatening the preservation 
of traditional minority folk music, Mackerras points out that artists who are recruited into state-
run professional troupes are given many benefits that are often denied to other performing artists, 
such as access to social services and a stable salary.298  Thus, Mackerras asserts that these artists 
are better off in professional troupes than they were before, when the state did not sponsor 
minority arts.299  Nevertheless, this method is suggestive of a carrot-and-stick approach – by 
controlling access to these benefits, the government is able to retain its control over yet another 
aspect of popular culture.   
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Furthermore, the education of minority artists in a system of training that is of Han origin 
denies any opportunity for these artists to break away from Han influence.  In discussing the new 
dynamics of professionalism in music, Baranovich states, “Minority artists and intellectuals were 
trained in Han-dominated official institutions, acquiring politically correct knowledge about their 
ethnic identity and learning how to represent it artistically in politically accepted venues”.300  
Thus, the revival of minority folk music and accelerated recruitment of minority artists may have 
created the image of diversity that Huang intended when he encouraged minorities to be “the real 
masters in their own house of culture” – however, whether or not these trends have benefited the 
development of traditional minority music is extremely questionable. 
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Discussion 
Cultural Hegemony of the CCP  
The development of contemporary min’ge has essentially redefined the understanding of 
folk music as grassroots, oral musical traditions that have been passed down through generations.  
As mentioned earlier, the changes in this definition of folk music have been influenced by the 
commercialization and modernization of music, certain government policies, and societal 
changes in terms of the professionalization and education of musicians.  However, although each 
of these factors have contributed to the development of contemporary min’ge in different ways, it 
is important to recognize that all of these processes assert the cultural hegemony of the CCP, 
where cultural hegemony is defined as the ability to control cultural production and assign 
cultural significance. 
First, the policy of “coming from the masses and going back to the masses” clearly 
outlined the intention of the government to gain control over all types of popular music, 
including folk music.  By determining developing and refining certain elements of traditional 
folk songs, but eliminating others, such as any pagan and religious significance, the CCP 
transformed the composition of folk music and accelerated the development of contemporary 
min’ge – a style of music which Wang Luobin first introduced.  Additionally, the government’s 
rigorous efforts to popularize this type of music and inspire people to “embrace it as their own” 
reveals the CCP’s supervision over not only the production of min’ge, but also its influence. 
Although Huang Zhen’s 1982 speech appears to be less dictatorial than Mao’s talks at 
Yan’an, in reality, it reiterated the tremendous amount of control the government maintained 
over minority arts.  In the end, minority music was still subject to the policies of the Party and 
functioned to serve the Party’s goals.  While “serving the Party” no longer requires the explicit 
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glorification of the CPP, songs like “Road to Heaven” are reminders that contemporary min’ge 
can function as government propaganda in multiple ways, including by celebrating its actions or 
projects.  
Similarly, though the commercialization of music suggests that the development of 
contemporary min’ge was not solely influenced by the government but also by economic forces, 
the modernization of min’ge tells an entirely different story.  While the modernization, or 
Westernization, of music is not unique to the genre of min’ge, the one of the main purposes 
behind the incorporation of Western musical elements was to revive old revolutionary songs.  In 
this way, the modernization of min’ge reflects the government’s strategy of repackaging 
revolutionary hong’ge to be more palatable for the contemporary audience. 
Finally, the education and professionalization of musicians has given the government a 
tremendous amount of control in terms of the creation and performance of min’ge.  Although 
there are important economic benefits to the professionalization of musicians, the government’s 
complete authority over the selection and training of minority individuals to state professional 
troupes effectively stymies any potential agency minorities have in terms of overturning the 
cultural hegemony of the CCP from within these Han-dominated institutions. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Issues of Representation and National Identity 
 
Cultural hegemony, defined as the complete authority over cultural production and 
significance, is not necessarily a novel concept.  In fact, the cultural hegemony of the CCP and 
the Han majority has been explored by both political scientists and anthropologists, and has led 
to related concepts such as “internal Orientalism”, which focuses on the exoticization of 
minorities.301  Beyond highlighting the privileged and dominant role the Chinese state has in 
constructing and representing ethnic identities, however, this chapter will also explore the 
significance of cultural hegemony in the context of different theories of nationalism, and its 
implications on Han-minority relations.  
At the first level of analysis, there are, essentially, two identities created by min’ge.  One 
is the representation of minorities as primitive and exotic, and the other is the representation of 
the Han as Westernized and advanced.302  The two representations work simultaneously to 
reinforce the idea of the Han as the enlightened leaders, similar to the “benevolent dictators” of 
China.303  A more in-depth analysis of min’ge’s role in Chinese nationalism presents the 
following contradiction: the same voice of the minorities that is popularized through min’ge 
functions to stifle their political voice.  There have, however, been exceptions, and these will be 
explored in the final section of this chapter.   
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The Dynamics of “Otherness” 
The issues of representation associated with the cultural hegemony of the CCP are 
particularly important to examine within min’ge due to the subliminal nature of its messages.304  
At a first glance, it is difficult to distinguish anything negative about the depiction of minorities.  
In fact, the tunes and lyrics are extremely appealing because they depict such picturesque scenes. 
“The Beautiful Grassland is My Home” (“Meili de caoyuan shi wode jia”), for example, became 
one of the most well-known “Mongolian” folk songs due to its alluring representation of the 
pastoral lifestyle of the Mongolian people.305  The lyrics idealize life in the countryside:  
The beautiful grassland is my home, 
The wind blows through the green grass  
and there are flowers everywhere 
Colored butterflies are flying  
and hundred birds are singing， 
The glow of the sunset is reflected in the blue water  
The coursers are just like the beautiful clouds, 
Flocks and herds are just like the pearls on the grassland. 
Ah ... ah ... he...  
Shepherd girls are singing openly,  
their delightful voices fill the skyline. 
 
The beautiful grassland is my home, 
I love its clear water and beautiful grassland. 
The grassland is just like the green sea,  
and the yurts are just like white lotus flowers. 
The herdsmen depict a happy landscape, 
and the beautiful spring scenery is just like a picture  
that extends ten thousand miles...  
Ah ... ah ... he...  
Shepherd girls are singing openly， 
their delightful voices fill the skyline.306 
 
Although the song does not have any malevolent intentions in its portrayal of the 
Mongolian people, it clearly does not reflect reality.  Firstly, it is important to note that despite 
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the songs reference to “shepherd girls”, there are few, if any, shepherds who are women.307   
Secondly, the pastoral lifestyle depicted in the song is not representative of the lifestyle followed 
by most ethnic Mongolians in China today.  Baranovich states, “Most Chinese and non-Chinese 
alike would probably be surprised to learn that of the 2,489,780 Mongols who inhabited Inner 
Mongolia in 1982, only 18% were pastoral nomads; most of the rest were agriculturalists”.308  
The percentage is even smaller today, with the government actively pursuing nomad resettlement 
policies.309  Intended to restore the grasslands in Inner Mongolia, the initiatives provide subsidies 
to herdsmen for selling off their flocks and moving to towns or cities.310  
Furthermore, while the song portrays the Mongolians as a peaceful and content minority, 
there has been a history of conflict between the Han and the Mongolians since the Qing 
Dynasty.311  Ethnic issues are even more tense now, due to the ever-increasing levels of Han 
migration to the area – only 20 percent of the population in Inner Mongolia today is ethnically 
Mongolian.312  In fact, in 2011, protests erupted after a Mongolian herdsman was struck and 
killed by a Han coal truck driver, which resulted in many students, professors and herders being 
taken into custody.313  Although the truck driver was eventually convicted and given a death 
sentence, the protests reflected the underlying enmity tied to longstanding grievances about the 
ecological destruction from the mining boom, the perception that economic growth 
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disproportionately benefits the Han, and the rapid disappearance of Inner Mongolia’s pastoral 
tradition.314  
However, outside of Inner Mongolia, these issues are little known.315  After the 2011 
protests, the government worked rapidly to restrict Internet access in the area, shut down several 
Mongolian news sources, and placed schools in areas with large ethnic Mongol populations on 
lockdown.316  The main source of information for foreign news outlets regarding the protests was 
the Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, which the Chinese government 
accused of possessing ulterior motives and sensationalizing the incident.317  This lack of 
information regarding ethnic conflicts allows for songs such as “The Beautiful Grassland is My 
Home” to maintain their popularity despite their strikingly inaccurate portrayals of minorities.318  
On the other hand, the continuing popularity of “The Beautiful Grassland is My Home” also 
ensures that this idealized, pastoral image of Inner Mongolia will continue to influence the 
perception of the public.319   
Thus, these “symbols of minority otherness” within min’ge effectively undermine the 
minorities’ abilities to portray their own realities.  Baranovitch writes, “through emphasizing the 
symbols of minority otherness, the state is trying to conceal or divert attention from activity that 
is destroying the reality of that otherness”.320  This is very much related to Huang Zhen’s 1982 
speech, where he emphasizes that all performing arts work “must aim to promote unity among 
the nationalities, including that among Han and minority workers in the performing arts, as well 
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as that among the various minority nationalities themselves”.321  Although this policy might have 
been formulated with good intentions, it invariably silences an important aspect of minority 
discourse – the reality that unity cannot be achieved without acknowledging the grievances of 
minorities.  By emphasizing unity and integration, min’ge serves the state’s goals of appearing 
committed to multiethnicity, but distorts the reality of the peoples it supposedly represents.  This 
has caused to authors such Ann Anagnost to assert that “most officially produced minority songs 
are more about minorities than of or for them”.322   
While min’ge raises many issues of representation, it is important to recognize that the 
effect of a particular song on its audience may be unintentional.  Baranovich, for example, points 
out that the last four lines of “The Sun in the Grassland Rises Never to Go Down” (“Cao yuan 
shang sheng qi bu luo de tai yang”), portray the Mongols as needing the guidance of Chairman 
Mao.323  They state: “Chairman Mao, ah! The Communist Party! They are bringing us up to 
maturity…” (Mao zhuxi ah! gongchandang! fuyu women chengzhang).324  Baranovich then 
asserts that this song reflects the Han people’s patronizing attitude towards minorities.  However, 
this argument is too simplistic because it does not take into consideration the fact that the 
composer, Meili Qige, is ethnically Mongolian, and many songs during this era (the 1950s) have 
similar messages of Chairman Mao and the Communist Party guiding the people.325  For 
example, in “The East is Red” (Dong fang hong), the lyrics refer to Mao as “the people’s great 
savior” (Ta shi renmin da jiuxing) and “the one who will lead our way in order to construct a 
new China” (Ta shi women dailu ren, weile jianshe xin zhongguo).326  Thus, the lyrics to “The 
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Sun in the Grassland Rises Never to Go Down” simply reflect the musical trends of that time 
period, and may not have an alternative meaning. 
However, regardless of intention, min’ge can reinforce the image of minorities as 
primitive and backward, which strengthens Han chauvinism.327  While certain motifs such as the 
image of a patronizing Mao are prevalent in both Han minority folk songs and ethnic minority 
folk songs, these motifs are given a new significance within min’ge precisely because they 
involve the appropriation of minority cultures.328  For example, because the image of the 
primitive minorities versus the advanced Han was established since the founding of the PRC, it is 
often believed that the Han should assist the minorities on the path to modernization.329  Thus, 
songs such as “The Sun in the Grassland Rises Never to Go Down” that portray minorities as 
welcoming the assistance of the Han people can appeal to this kind of Han chauvinism, even 
though they were not necessarily written with this intent.   
Furthermore, the portrayal of minorities as requiring the aid of the government is not 
always as explicit as the lines in “The Sun in the Grassland Rises Never to Go Down” calling for 
Chairman Mao’s guidance are, but often carry the same problematic representations of minority 
peoples.  As mentioned in Chapter 3, the song “Road to Heaven” praises the Party by expressing 
the gratitude of the Tibetan people for the Beijing-Lhasa railway.  Although the railway was a 
controversial project that was met with local protests from the Tibetan communities, the song 
reinforces the benevolence of the Party and glorifies the railroad as “carrying the warmth of the 
world to the border area” and “making mountains and roads no longer inaccessible”.330   
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The popularity of “Road to Heaven” also diminishes mainstream knowledge about the 
concerns of the Tibetan communities regarding the railway.331  The song, written by Han 
composers Yin Qing and Qu Yuan, and performed by half-Tibetan singer Han Hong, gained 
significant recognition through being featured on the CCTV Chinese New Year Gala in 2005 and 
recently regained its popularity on the “I am a Singer” (Wo shi geshou) singing competition in 
2015.332  However, despite the song’s positive portrayal of the railroad, there have been 
numerous complaints that the railway’s $4.2 billion price tag is almost triple the amount Beijing 
spends in Tibet on health care and education, and concerns that an influx of long-term migrants 
will threaten the Tibetans’ cultural integrity.333  With no unified resistance however, the 
government has continued to expand the railway line.  In August 2014, China opened a $2-
billion extension of the railway to Shigatse, the traditional seat of Tibetan Buddhism's second-
highest figure, the Panchen Lama.334  According to Reuters, China is also currently planning to 
build a second railway line linking Lhasa to the southwestern city of Chengdu, and will 
eventually extend the railway to the borders of India, Nepal and Bhutan by 2020.335 
In addition to the “primitive” representation of minorities, the focus on the female form is 
another aspect within min’ge that reinforces a hierarchy between the Han and the minorities.336  
To Han composers, love songs focusing on the female form are common in all types of folk 
songs, and therefore considered acceptable, and even highly appealing, material for the creation 
of min’ge.337  However, the objectification of the minority female by Han composers inevitably 
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recreates the power dynamic between the creator and his creation.338  In ethnic minority music, 
this power dynamic takes on another layer of meaning.  For example, the song “Dabancheng 
Girl”, composed by Wang Luobin, is essentially the translation of a Uyghur folk song called 
“Qämbärkhan”.339  Phrases such as “Lift up your veil, let me see your face” and “Don’t marry 
anyone else, you must marry me” have basis in the original folk song.340  However, the Mandarin 
lyrics have caused a controversy among Uyghur music critics, mainly due to the fact that the 
composer is Han.341  Harris notes, “the same objectifying gaze on a woman’s body is perceived 
very differently when it is expressed by the Other, in this case the Han Chinese”.342  This may be 
due to the fact that similar to how the subordination of women reinforces the elevated position of 
men, the objectification of minority women implicitly establishes the dominance of the Han.343 
The minority female is also portrayed as more sexual than the Han woman in many 
instances.344  For example, the marketing of Uyghur min’ge often utilizes provocative images of 
Near Eastern belly dancers, highlighting the commodification of the minority female.345  This 
has caused significant resentment from the Uyghur community because, as Gladney notes, “As 
Muslims, they [women] are generally much more conservative than Han Chinese in the public 
sexual sphere”.346  However, this sexualized representation has continued, highlighting the 
insensitivity many composers have towards the cultures from which they derive creative 
inspiration.347  Furthermore, this tendency to appropriate the female Other is also common to 
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many other forms of art, including fine arts and cinema.348  This trend in the arts hints at its 
utility in defining ethnic relations in China.  Ultimately, the sexualization of minority women 
contributes to the exoticization of minorities, which strengthens the imagined identity of the Han 
and reaffirms Han feelings of superiority.349  
The emphasis on the “otherness” of minorities has its limits, however.  Rachel Harris 
notes that in many recording of “Dabancheng Girl”, the unique characteristics of Uyghur folk 
songs are “ironed out and replaced with a stereotyped pseudo-exotic sound”.350  She 
hypothesizes that this process is similar to the Orientalism present in Western music, in which 
Eastern musical forms are stereotyped and used as motifs representing repressed sexuality and 
the unknown.351  For example, while Wang Luobin’s songs maintain the stereotypical upbeat 
tempo of Uyghur dances, the asymmetric rhythms of many Uyghur songs are replaced with a 
regular four-beat, and the complex modality of Uyghur music is adapted to the pentatonic 
scale.352   
These changes are particularly salient in another one of Wang Luobin’s songs, “Mayila”, 
which recently gained another surge of popularity through a Han min’ge singer named Chang 
Sisi.353  In the music video, Chang Sisi and her background dancers appear in Uyghur style 
costumes that are altered to reveal their midriffs.354  Additionally, she performs “Mayila” with a 
smooth, nasalized tone and adds many ornamentations typical of Western coloratura arias.355  
The result is a very culturally muddied production, but it is precisely this dynamic of “exotic-
with-limitations” that contributes to its popularity.  Harris notes, “That Wang Luobin’s songs are 
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re-presented in the style of contemporary Chinese popular song but with a stereotyped exotic 
twist, as the performers mediate and as it were tame the wildness of the feared Other, is key in 
understanding their popularity and selling power”.356   
Thus, while contemporary minority min’ge has been celebrated for promoting diversity 
and national unity, the limits placed upon “otherness” and authentic representation undermine its 
ability to have true cultural significance.  As Han composers assert their ability to pick and 
choose the most favorable and appealing qualities of traditional minority folk songs, and as these 
songs are continually considered “authentic”, the perception of minority peoples will always be 
influenced by the stereotypes that these songs perpetuate.  
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The Dynamics of Westernization 
In Chapter 2, I introduced new forms of popular music that were influenced by the West, 
and subsequently in Chapter 3, I explored the Westernization of min’ge in relation to the 
commodification and modernization of Chinese music.  In Chapter 3, I also introduced another 
type of contemporary min’ge influenced by Western classical styles that can be characterized as 
a refined and “repackaged” version of hong’ge.  In this section, I intend to further detail the 
development of this type of min’ge and explore its significance, especially in terms of 
maintaining and strengthening the Han identity.  The significance is essentially twofold – (1) its 
popularization has facilitated the erasure of differences between the Han and created a myth of 
shared traditions, and (2) its imitation of Western classical styles contributes to the modern and 
advanced image of the Han.  
In some ways, Westernized min’ge merely imitates musical forms promoted by 
Communist countries.  Its two defining characteristics – the manipulation of folk tunes for 
glorification of the state and the assimilation of Western classical elements – are very similar to 
the folk songs popularized by the Soviet government during the 1990s.357  The homogeny within 
this genre has also led scholars such as Liu to sympathize with Mainland composers who are 
“muzzled by the Communist Party’s policy on literature and art” and unable to express their 
individual styles.358  However, although the cultural hegemony of the CCP may be attributed to 
the authoritarian nature of Communist governments, the manipulation of traditions for the 
purposes of nationalism has been studied in a variety of contexts, giving rise to the theory of 
ethnosymbolism.359   
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In the theory of ethnosymbolism, the formation and continuity of national identities is 
dependent upon myths, memories, values, traditions, and symbols.360  In line with this theory, it 
is important to recognize that the significance of folk culture has been tied to political 
preferences since the early 1900s.361  For example, during the May Fourth Movement, there was 
a brief revival of interest in folk music because folk traditions represented a departure from 
Confucian values and the elitist traditions of the literati.362  Returning to indigenous culture was 
viewed as a means to improve society, and thus, Eminov asserts, “folklore journals came to be 
filled with the idea of using folklore studies in order to modernize society”.363  However, as 
modernization became increasingly synonymous with Westernization after the collapse of the 
Qing Dynasty, the study of folk music was cast aside.364  In fact, folk culture came to be 
regarded as hazardous and reactionary during the Chiang Kai-shek regime, and the “anti-
superstition” campaign of the 1920s deemed many folk songs inappropriate for the 
modernization of country.365  It was not until Mao’s Talks at Yan’an that folk culture was once 
again celebrated – this time, due to its connection to the peasants, who were instrumental to the 
Communist revolution.366 
However, Mao not only re-popularized folk music, but also selectively changed its 
characteristics.367  As Mao demanded that the only acceptable forms of art were those with 
revolutionary meaning, folk music assimilated revolutionary lyrics and composers reintroduced 
folk songs to the masses in more Westernized forms.368  On a superficial level, the purpose of 
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this transformation, as stated by Mao in the Talks at Yan’an, was to promote the revolution.369  
However, Mao differed from the other leaders and intellectuals before him who treated folk 
music as a means to achieve political goals.  Besides promoting revolution, Mao utilized folk 
music to create a new national identity.370  Thus, beyond merely promoting folk music as others 
leaders had done before, Mao actively controlled the artistic process and redefined the meaning 
of “folk”.371   
This myth of shared traditions that Mao promoted was especially significant to Han 
nationalism, because it promoted the erasure of inter-Han differences.372  For example, to 
overcome the communication difficulties associated with the multitude of mutually unintelligible 
dialects within the Han community, the government was faced with the challenge of instituting a 
national language.373  Although Mandarin was already the official language of China under the 
Guomindang, the Communist Party reinstated an official language policy in 1956 to accelerate 
the adoption of a national language.374  The instruction of singing in Mandarin and simultaneous 
popularization of Mandarin songs became two important ways by which the government 
promoted their language policy.375  Incidentally, the spread of Mandarin also affected min’ge, 
which was traditionally sung in local dialects.376  Tuohy states, “Vocal music proved to be a 
vehicle for the dissemination of national standard speech, and that speech became the dominant 
language of the national musical voice”.377  
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Still, some scholars believed this myth of shared traditions would be fragile and easily 
rejected.  For example, Eminov, in exploring the modernization of Chinese theater, states, “It 
still remains to be seen whether the Chinese Communist Party's persuasive propaganda 
techniques, as manifested in the modern theater as well as in other genres, are powerful and 
subtle enough to eradicate a tradition so central to the lives of the people, and to replace it with 
the products of modern socialist realism”.378  Similarly, Liu warns, “Insincere works, whether of 
literature or music, which are composed simply to demonstrate loyalty to a political regime, will 
in time fade away”.379  Westernized min’ge, which include refined versions of old revolutionary 
songs, would therefore never be influential due to its politicization and artificiality. 
However, in the case of min’ge, although many people still prefer traditional art forms of 
the past, such as Beijing opera or traditional folk songs, it is clear that the CCP’s “persuasive 
propaganda techniques” are indeed working.380  As Rees notes, “many Chinese musicians, 
especially those professionally trained in national conservatories such as the Central 
Conservatory and the China Conservatory in Beijing or the Shanghai Conservatory of Music, see 
no contradiction in calling this modern style [of contemporary min’ge] ‘traditional’”.381  
Furthermore, Professor Liu Huimin, a vocal instructor at the China Conservatory of Music, notes 
that today, the term min’ge is synonymous with contemporary min’ge much more so than 
traditional min’ge.382  If one is referring to traditional minority min’ge, for example, one would 
have to use the term shaoshu minzu min’ge.383  This suggests that Mao’s policy of “coming from 
the masses and going back to the masses” was extremely effective – more than 50 years later, 
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even the professionals who would be aware of the politicization of min’ge accept contemporary 
min’ge as traditional. 
Beyond the categorization of this genre of music as both “folk” and “traditional”, it is 
also important to note that Westernization is viewed as natural and inevitable in the process of 
modernization.  As explored in Chapter 2, the marching songs and patriotic anthems composed 
for the Mass Singing Movement were all inspired by the desire to modernize China after the May 
Fourth Movement of the early 1900s.  During the May Fourth Movement and for many years 
after, modernity was often equated to Westernization and thus new forms of popular music 
continued to be Western importations.384  Liu discusses the development of this “New Music” as 
follows: 
“As one element of the relationship between China and the West since the mid nineteenth 
century, the development of New Music in China over the past hundred years has been 
motivated by a desire to emulate the music culture of the great powers of Europe and to 
modernize, i.e., Europeanize, the ‘backward’ music of China. It has involved 
experimenting with a range of ideas, from ‘Chinese learning as the essence, Western 
learning for practical application’ to ‘total Westernization’. Although, superficially, this 
does appear to have produced some music with a Chinese flavor, it has in face resulted in 
the implementation of a policy in which education, performance, and composition have 
all been dominated by European music”385 
 
Although Liu could be dismissed as possessing a Eurocentric view, he also asserts his 
optimism in the ability of Chinese music to develop independently.  He states: 
“The twenty-first century is the time when the Chinese music world should regain its 
confidence, when it ceases to see the West as superior to the East, and does not need to see the 
East as superior to the West but makes use of the power of the West to allow the full 
development of the might of the East”386   
 
                                               
384 Tuohy 2001. 
385 Liu, 631. 
386 Liu, 635. 
 73 
However, today, as so-called “traditional” styles such as min’ge become even more 
influenced by Western classical styles, it appears that Chinese music may be moving in a 
direction opposite of Liu’s predictions.  
The changes in voice instruction, for example, illustrate the preference for Western styles.  
In my interview with Professor Liu Huimin, she notes that the genre of min’ge today is not much 
different from Western classical opera (mei sheng).387  She states, “The singing techniques are 
essentially the same – the only thing different is the style (feng’ge)”.388  In my interview with 
Professor Wang Sufen, another voice instructor at the China Conservatory of Music, she 
conveyed a similar view of the recent developments of min’ge, noting that many min’ge voice 
teachers at the university level will instruct their students to sing in a “Western operatic” way 
and emphasize Western singing techniques to produce a fuller sound.389   
This Westernization has produced a fundamental contradiction within the current 
definition of “traditional” Chinese music that is applicable to min’ge.  Hamm ironically notes in 
his description of “light music” that many of these so-called “traditional” tunes sound like 
“Muzak or Easy Listening FM programming” to Western ears.390  Likewise, when an ensemble 
from the Central Conservatory of Music performed a program of “traditional” Chinese music in 
Durham, England as a part of an Oriental Music Festival in 1979, foreign music scholars were 
hesitant to accept it as authentic, due to the fact that the music used Western forms and 
harmonies and featured modern European instruments.391  In response, the leader of the Chinese 
delegation, Fang Kun, argued: 
                                               
387 "Professor Liu: Min'ge Performance and Vocal Techniques." Personal interview. 4 Jan. 2016. 
388 Ibid. 
389 "Professor Wang: Min'ge Performance and Vocal Techniques." Personal interview. 5 Jan. 2016. 
390 Hamm, 7. 
391 Hamm, 12. 
 74 
“We really felt that they did not entirely understand the circumstances surrounding 
Chinese music and its development… The pieces that we played were traditional pieces of either 
classical or folk origin… Some of them contain many newly composed elements, some a few, 
but all of them are linked to the same flesh and blood as Chinese traditional music.  When we 
selected a program like this it was because we recognized that in order to understand traditional 
music, it is not only necessary to understand its classical and folk origins, but also to understand 
its modern evolution… The approach that we suggest for traditional music is based on making 
the past serve the present, weeding out the old to bring forth the new, selecting the fine and 
discarding the rubbish, and eliminating the false and retaining the genuine”392  
 
With this statement, Fang’s views seem to align with Mackerras’ view that folk music is 
“a developing tradition and consequently subject to change”.393  In fact, many Chinese music 
scholars dismissed the criticisms from foreign scholars as Eurocentric comments that intended to 
discourage the development of Chinese music.394  However, even though the ability for Western 
scholars to define traditional Chinese music is questionable, the continual Westernization of 
min’ge highlights certain aspects of Chinese nationalism that are critical to the understanding of 
both the Han identity and Han-minority relations.  
Since the establishment of the PRC, government officials have recognized that singing is 
an important element in constructing the state’s image.395  This image is the basis for influencing 
popular nationalism, or how the citizens of China perceive themselves in relation to other 
countries.396  For this reason, one of the first problems addressed by the Communications Office 
of Musical Issues (Yinyue wenti tongxunbu) was whether conservatories should adopt Western 
singing methods, or retain traditional methods of instruction.397  According to Tuohy, most music 
scholars believed that schools should assimilate the best qualities of both, but under Mao, 
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“something stained with the association of ‘foreign’ could be troublesome”.398  Therefore, 
Western song forms were adopted but the singing techniques were still authentic to folk styles.399   
After Mao, however, the increased Westernization of singing techniques reveals not only 
a more welcoming attitude towards foreign influences, but also the desire for China to appear 
more Westernized and modern on the global stage.  The image of a Westernized, modern China 
plays into the “victor” narrative outlined by Peter Gries, who notes that the CCP has relied on the 
victor narrative to dispel the previous image of China as the “sick man of Asia”.400  In 
comparison to the “victim” narrative, which is often xenophobic, the victor narrative, which 
emphasizes how China “stood up” to the West and has successfully modernized while 
maintaining “socialism with Chinese characteristics”, seems most relevant to min’ge today.  
Contemporary min’ge, with its highly Westernized elements but Chinese flavor (or feng’ge) is 
the epitome of the modern but distinctly “Chinese” image that the government strives to 
achieve.401   
Besides allowing the Chinese people to see themselves as equals to other Westernized 
countries, the Westernization of min’ge also allows the Han to view themselves as more 
advanced and superior to the “backward” minorities.  Whereas the adoption of minority folk 
songs often emphasizes the “otherness” of minority cultures, the Westernization of min’ge tends 
to promote homogenization.  This dynamic is particularly important within Han nationalism as 
Gladney notes that the representation of the Han as “normal” and “un-exotic” is critical for 
distinguishing the Han from the minorities.402  However, the Han identity is not only 
strengthened through the exoticization of the minorities, but also through the proactive creation 
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of cultural products that highlight the modernity and progress of the Han majority.  Because the 
concept of ethnic groups or minzu did not exist in China until the end of the Qing dynasty, 
reinforcing the myth of a shared history and culture between the Han people has been a critical 
part of nation-building.403  Within this nation-building process, the concept of the Han as being 
the most civilized and advanced ethnic group has justified the Han majority’s authority to aid the 
minorities in changing their “backward” ways.404  Thus, the Westernization of contemporary 
min’ge, which is fundamentally a Han creation, reinforces the divide between the “modern” Han 
and “backwards” minorities. 
The portrayal of the Han as closer to modernity and the West is also reflected in the 
performance of contemporary min’ge.  For example, whereas traditional min’ge will often be 
performed in the traditional dress of a certain minority, Westernized min’ge is performed in 
Western concert attire (e.g. tuxedos and gowns).405  Furthermore, contemporary min’ge is often 
placed in the same category as Western classical for singing competitions, while traditional 
min’ge is considered a separate category.406  For example, in the Youth Vocal Singing 
Competition (Qing Ge Sai), one of the most well known competitions for professionals, singers 
can compete in the categories of contemporary min’ge and Western opera, but traditional 
minority min’ge is separated into another competition by itself.407  Although difficulty in judging 
the different styles of regional min’ge has been one of the considerations for this separation408, 
this clear divide between traditional and contemporary min’ge reiterates the idea that 
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contemporary min’ge represents progress and is therefore on par with the West, whereas 
traditional min’ge cannot be judged by “modern” standards.   
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Voices of Resistance 
 The cultural hegemony of the CCP has not existed without resistance.  Baranovich, for 
example, notes two prominent minority artists, Teng Ge’er and Lolo, who have been working to 
create more realistic representations of their respective ethnic groups through their music.409  
Like the voice of resistance that rock music provided in the 1980s, these artists have been 
successful due to their popularity.  For example, the song “The Land of the Blue Wolf” by Teng 
Ge’er articulates a clear sense of opposition the state and Han control in Inner Mongolia.410  The 
lyrics state:  
The sun moves back and forth between the Tropic of Capricorn and the Tropic of Cancer 
The herding people wander on the temperate grassland 
I heard once 
That the nomadic people were the masters of the mainland 
Aha! Ya hu! A hu! Ya wei hu! 
 
The sun comes up and goes away again 
All thing on earth grow and then disappear 
Several hundred years have already passed by in the world 
My rulers of former days where are you now 
Aha! Yu hu! A hu! Yu wei hu! 
 
The steeds have lost their masters 
The hunting dogs have lost their steeds 
The land of the blue world is yellow sand 
How lonely is the grassland in the wind 
Aha! Yu hu! A hu! Yu wei hu!411 
 
 Such subversive lyrics would normally be prone to censorship and result in negative 
consequences for the composer, but due to the widespread recognition of his music in Inner 
Mongolia as well as Taiwan and Hong Kong, the government has allowed Teng Ge’er to become 
a representative of the Mongolian people.412  After a brief period of censorship in 1992, Teng 
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Ge’er has performed regularly on Chinese TV, including on state-controlled venues such as 
CCTV programming.413  
 However, although Baranovich considers Teng Ge’er an example of successful resistance 
from minorities in regards to reclaiming their identities, it is important to note certain limitations 
to their resistance.  For example, while the government has accepted Teng Ge’er as a 
representative of the Mongolian people, CCTV only broadcasts his song, “The Mongol”, which 
is much less radical and politically charged than “The Land of the Blue Wolf”.414  Furthermore, 
Henochowicz notes that Teng Ge’er often sings songs promoting mainland Chinese identity, 
reflecting compromises made to attract a larger audience and avoid political persecution.415  Thus, 
political and economic interests often temper the resistance from minorities within the realm of 
music. 
 Still, the growing popularity of minority artists who aspire to create a unique identity for 
themselves and their ethic groups suggests that the cultural hegemony of the CCP may not be as 
pervasive as before.  For example, artists such as Hanggai, a Mongolian rock band, and Ablajan, 
a Uyghur pop star, have gained significant popularity both within and outside of their home 
bases.416  Although these artists nonetheless face the pressures of being monitored by the state, a 
growing number of alternative performance sites and music festivals has allowed them to enjoy 
an unusual degree of financial security and cultural prominence.417  Their success may indicate 
an optimistic future for minorities reclaiming the representation of their identities through music 
– one day, perhaps min’ge will be truly reflective of the diversity within China. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 In Chapter 1, I established two main areas of exploration within this thesis: (1) the nature 
of min’ge today, and (2) why the CCP supports and promotes min’ge.  Here, I will summarize 
my findings and relate my conclusions to the theories of nationalism discussed in the literature 
review.   
 
The Nature of Min’ge 
Through my analysis of the changes within min’ge in Chapter 3, I was able distinguish 
between traditional and contemporary min’ge.  While traditional min’ge reflects the diversity of 
the people, contemporary min’ge is a product of the CCP’s cultural hegemony, and therefore not 
truly representative of the people.  Because the preservation of traditional min’ge has been 
difficult due to the persecution of folk singers during the Cultural Revolution and the 
overwhelming influence of modern popular culture, contemporary min’ge has emerged as a 
genre that assimilates aspects of traditional min’ge into Western forms.  The politicization of 
contemporary min’ge after the Yan’an Talks reflects the CCP’s control over cultural production 
and significance, which I refer to as cultural hegemony.  Through asserting this cultural 
hegemony, the CCP has been able to shape min’ge into a mechanism for the promotion of 
Chinese nationalism.  However, there are unintended consequences from the promotion of this 
genre – like the minzu policy, the min’ge policy was intended to encourage the minorities to 
follow the Han example, but ultimately, it also allows minorities to distinguish and celebrate 
their own identities. 
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The Utility of Min’ge 
 One of the reasons why min’ge an ideal mechanism to the state is due to its ability to 
bridge state nationalism, Han nationalism, popular nationalism, and pragmatic nationalism.  In 
terms of state nationalism, Huang Zhen’s 1982 speech on the Party’s policy towards the 
performing arts of minority groups reflects the more tolerant and pluralistic attitudes in the 
state’s cultural policies after the Cultural Revolution.418  As the only representation permitted 
under Huang’s banner of promoting diversity is the “carefree and happy” minority, min’ge is an 
extension of state nationalism which intends to celebrate China’s cultural policies.  In reality, 
however, contemporary min’ge exposes the relatively little progress that has been made in 
addressing the marginalization of minorities. 
The discrepancy between the image of minorities presented in min’ge and reality places 
the shortcomings of the CCP’s cultural policies in the spotlight in a very literal sense.  Indeed, 
the pastoral image often emphasized in contemporary Mongolian min’ge contradicts the ethnic 
tensions and environmental degradation present within Inner Mongolia today – similar to how 
the gratefulness of the Tibetans for the Beijing-Lhasa express train expressed in “Road to 
Heaven” completely dismisses the concerns that were raised during and after the construction of 
the railroad.  This clear contradiction between the minorities’ voices within min’ge and the lack 
of voice from the people has caused significant tension and even inspired forms of resistance 
from those familiar with minority issues.  However, for the majority of the Chinese population, 
the continuing popularity of min’ge reinforces its ability to undermine the voices of the 
minorities and conceal the shortcomings of the CCP’s cultural policies in promoting equality and 
diversity.  
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 In addition to weakening the voices of the minorities, min’ge also serves to strengthen the 
unity of the Han people through promoting the myth of a shared identity and asserting Han 
superiority.  In line with the theory of ethnosymbolism, because hanzu is an artificial concept, it 
must be maintained through a variety of mechanisms, such as promoting a common language, 
redefining folk traditions, and emphasizing the “otherness” of the non-Han.419  As detailed in 
Chapter 4, min’ge has played a pivotal role within each of these mechanisms.  Beyond 
strengthening the Han identity, min’ge also serves to legitimize the CCP’s rule.  The repetition of 
symbols of otherness within contemporary min’ge such as the sexualized female form, 
stereotypically “exotic” musical patterns, and appreciative attitude of the minorities reinforces 
the view that the minorities are less civilized than the Han, and therefore require guidance and 
modernization.  Simultaneously, the Westernization of min’ge portrays the Han as more modern 
and advanced, alluding to their role as the “vanguard of the revolution”, and justifying their 
dominating position as the leaders of the country.  In this way, the Han nationalism evoked by 
min’ge serves both to create a sense of unity among the Han, and to legitimize power of the more 
“civilized” majority. 
While it is clear that min’ge creates false representations of both minorities and the Han, 
the problematic elements of min’ge are often difficult to detect because they have been accepted 
as the “norm”, and – particularly in regards to the exoticization of minority min’ge – often serve 
as crucial selling points.  The hidden nature of these dynamics is what also makes min’ge so 
powerful, as posited by the idea of banal nationalism.420  Thus, despite the very obvious 
distortions of reality, immensely popular songs such as “Road to Heaven” and “The Beautiful 
Grassland is My Home” are able to maintain a favorable image of the government and Han-
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minority relations.  The government has also bolstered the recognition and airtime of min’ge on 
popular state sponsored programs such as the Chinese New Year Gala on CCTV (China Central 
Television), where over half of these programs is consistently devoted to min’ge.421  This state-
sponsored promotion of min’ge suggests that the CCP’s policy of “coming from the masses and 
going back to the masses” from the mass line ideology is still effective.  As these “refined” 
versions of traditional folk songs are assimilated into the mainstream, their artificiality is often 
ignored which validates their utility to the state. 
 Min’ge may also play an important role in external nationalism.422  Popular nationalism, a 
type of external nationalism as explored in Chapter 1, is often xenophobic and influenced to a 
great extent by the victim narrative.  However, while some famous min’ge songs such as “My 
Motherland” that were written during wartime have shades of xenophobia423, contemporary 
min’ge today mainly focuses on the greatness of China and its achievements.  This shift away 
from the victim narrative perpetuated by Jiang Zemin towards a victor narrative reflects the 
general caution of the government towards popular nationalism, and suggests that min’ge may be 
an extension of pragmatic nationalism.  In fact, as tensions in the South China have not ceased, 
the CCP may be incentivized to monitor any xenophobic popular nationalism that may pressure 
the state to take unnecessarily aggressive actions.   Furthermore, the victor narrative plays into 
the idea of “Chinese exceptionalism”, where China is able to modernize without democratizing 
or following an entirely Western model.  A part of this Chinese exceptionalism draws on the 
historical notion that China was once the “Middle Kingdom” with the most powerful and 
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advanced society in the world.424  The Westernization of min’ge, therefore, reflects the desire to 
emphasize the modernization of China while simultaneously highlighting the distinctiveness of 
Chinese culture.   
 Thus, my initial hypothesis that min’ge is more relevant to internal nationalism must be 
rejected.  While I hypothesized that min’ge would be more relevant to internal nationalism 
because its popularity is limited to mainland China and its subject matter often draws from ethnic 
minorities, I have discovered through in-depth analyses that the scope of the utility of min’ge 
extends to external nationalism.  In terms of internal nationalism, it functions to hide the CCP’s 
cultural policy failures and promote Han unity and superiority.  The cultural hegemony that is the 
foundation for min’ge also exacerbates ethnic tensions, as the privilege of representation is 
limited to the Han.  However, in a broader sense, min’ge creates the image of a “modern” and 
“Westernized” Chinese people, which is important to not only monitor xenophobic sentiments 
common to popular nationalism, but also to emphasize Chinese exceptionalism.  The utility of 
min’ge is also strengthened by its hidden nature and popularity, which ensures that its messages 
will continue to be unconsciously accepted by the masses. 
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Final Comments 
 Despite the cautionary and critical nature of my thesis, I cannot conclude without 
qualifying any condemnation of the CCP.  Indeed, it is unfair to point to the politicization of 
min’ge and its appropriation of folk traditions as a unique phenomenon.  First, the politicization 
of music in China has roots in the early 20th century, as explored in Chapter 2.  Furthermore, the 
CCP’s cultural hegemony follows a Soviet model, as the appropriation of folk music was often a 
straightforward extension of the policies of Communist regimes following World War II.425  The 
manipulation of folklore is also common to non-Communist states, however.  Gladney notes that 
the invention of folklore in Germany was “based upon 19th-century romanticist attempts to 
describe the unity of their nation based on a common cultural and historical heritage that was 
reconstructed from relics of ancient traditions in German folk customs and narratives”.426  
Folklore in Latin America has also been manipulated by ruling elites.  Kaarsholm and James note 
that in Argentina and Brazil, folklore “became part of the legitimation of 1940s and 1950s 
populism through which leaders attempted to keep an ear to the ground and shape policy in 
accord with perceived responses from ‘the people’”.427  Thus, while min’ge plays into China’s 
narrative of exceptionalism, it is clear that China is not so exceptional after all.   
However, despite its obvious exploitation of folk tradition, the solution to appropriation is 
not simple – Harris points out that the legal protection of indigenous peoples’ cultural assets is 
often not protected by domestic or international law.428  Moreover, the development of min’ge 
has led to certain benefits for minority musicians.  In addition to the economic benefits 
mentioned in Chapter 3, the popularity of min’ge has also allowed minority musicians to push 
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the boundaries of representation within the CCP’s system of cultural hegemony.  This reflects 
the contradictory role folk music can play in the creation of a unified national identity, as posited 
by the theory of ethnosymbolism.  As musicians such as Teng Ge’er and Hanggai slowly gain 
recognition, their music may turn the tides of Han nationalism in favor of ethnic nationalism, just 
as the popularization of Serbian folk epics during the 1990s was a form of resistance against 
nationalist tensions.  In that case, min’ge would have achieved the opposite of what the CCP 
intended – as minorities reclaim their music, their voices become all the more powerful. 
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Barmé, Geremie. In the Red: On Contemporary Chinese Culture. New York: Columbia UP,
 1999. Print. 
Billig, Michael. Banal Nationalism. London: Sage, 1995. Print. 
Blanchard, Ben. "China Opens $2-billion Extension of Controversial Tibet Railway." Reuters. 
Thomson Reuters, 15 Aug. 2014. Web. 09 Apr. 2016. 
Brace, Tim. "Popular Music in Contemporary Beijing: Modernism and Cultural Identity." Asian
 Music 22.2, Views of Music in China Today (1991): 43-66. JSTOR. Web. 03 Mar. 2016. 
Bryant, Lei Ouyang. "Music, Memory, and Nostalgia: Collective Memories of Cultural
 Revolution Songs in Contemporary China." China Review 5.2 (2005): 151-75. JSTOR.
 Web. 03 Nov. 2014.  
Campbell, Jonathan. Red Rock: The Long, Strange March of Chinese Rock & Roll. Hong Kong:
 Earnshaw, 2011. Print. 
Chang Sisi Mayila Bianzouqu. Dir. Qian Wang. Perf. Chang Sisi. Iqiyi.com. Iqiyi.com, Apr. 
2009. Web. 
 88 
Cheek, Timothy. "The Fading of Wild Lilies: Wang Shiwei and Mao Zedong's Yan'an Talks in
 the First CPC Rectification Movement." The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs No.
 11 (1984): 25-58. JSTOR. Web. 04 Mar. 2016. 
Chow, Kai-wing, Kevin M. Doak, and Poshek Fu, eds. Constructing Nationhood in Modern East
 Asia. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan, 2001. Print. 
Chow, Tse-tung. The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China. Boston:
 Harvard UP, 1960. Print. 
Cole, Sarah. "Nationalism and Modernism." MFS Modern Fiction Studies 48.2 (2002): 453-460.
 Project MUSE. Web. 27 Dec. 2014. <http://muse.jhu.edu/>. 
Davis, Elizabeth Van Wie. Ruling, Resources and Religion in China: Managing the Multiethnic
 State in the 21st Century. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. Print. 
Dhondup, Yangdon. "Dancing to the Beat of Modernity: The Rise and Development of Tibetan
 Pop Music." Tibetan Modernities (2008): 285-304. 
Dittmer, Lowell, and Samuel S. Kim, eds. China's Quest for National Identity. Ithaca: Cornell
 UP, 1993. Print. 
Duara, Prasenjit. "Knowledge and Power in the Discourse of Modernity: The Campaigns Against 
Popular Religion in Early Twentieth-Century China." The Journal of Asian Studies 50.1 
(1991): 67-83. JSTOR. Web. 15 Apr. 2016. 
Eminov, Sandra. "Folklore and Nationalism in Modern China." Journal of the Folklore 
Institute 12.2/3 (1975): 257-77. JSTOR. Web. 18 Apr. 2016. 
Florcruz, Michelle. "China-Nepal Railway Through Mount Everest: China Plans To Expand 
Controversial Tibet Railway To Nepal." World News. International Business Times, 09 
Apr. 2015. Web. 09 Apr. 2016. 
 89 
Ford, Peter. "How Pianist Lang Lang Stirred up Trouble for US and China at a White House 
State Dinner." The Christian Science Monitor. The Christian Science Monitor, 26 Jan. 
2011. Web. 27 Apr. 2016. 
Galikowski, Maria. Art and Politics in China, 1949-1984. Hong Kong: Chinese UP, 1998. Print. 
Gladney, Dru C. "Ethnic Identity in China: The New Politics of Difference." China Briefing,
 1994. Ed. William A. Joseph. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993. 171-92. Print. 
Gladney, Dru C. Dislocating China: Reflections on Muslims, Minorities, and Other Subaltern 
Subjects. Chicago: U of Chicago, 2004. Print. 
Gladney, Dru C. "Representing Nationality in China: Refiguring Majority/Minority 
Identities." The Journal of Asian Studies 53.1 (1994): 92-123. JSTOR. Web. 18 Apr. 2016. 
Gries, Peter Hays. China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy. Berkeley: U of
 California, 2004. Print. 
Gries, Peter Hays, and Stanley Rosen, eds. Chinese Politics: State, Society and the Market.
 London: Routledge, 2010. Print. 
Grosby, Steven Elliott, and Athena S. Leoussi. Nationalism and Ethnosymbolism: History,
 Culture and Ethnicity in the Formation of Nations. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2007.
 Print. 
Guo, Sujian, and Baogang Guo, eds. China in Search of a Harmonious Society. Lanham, MD:
 Lexington, 2008. Print. 
Guo, Yingjie. Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary China: The Search for National Identity
 Under Reform. London: Routledge, 2004. Print. 
Hamm, Charles. "Music and Radio in the People's Republic of China." Asian Music 22.2, Views
 of Music in China Today (1991): 1-42. JSTOR. Web. 04 Mar. 2016. 
 90 
Han, Enze. Contestation and Adaptation: The Politics of National Identity in China. New York:
 Oxford UP, 2013. Print. 
Harris, R. "Wang Luobin: Folk Song King of the Northwest or Song Thief?: Copyright,
 Representation, and Chinese Folk Songs." Modern China 31.3 (2005): 381-408. Web. 
Henochowicz, Anne. "Blue Heaven, Parched Land: Mongolian Folksong and the Chinese 
State." Graduate Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies 6.1 (2008): 37-50. 
Ho, Wai-Chung. "Social Change and Nationalism in China's Popular Songs." Social History
 31.4 (2006): 435-53. JSTOR. Web. 03 Nov. 2014. 
Holm, David. Art and Ideology in Revolutionary China. Oxford: Clarendon, 1991. Print. 
Huang, Chengju. "Power, Ambition, and Arrogance: Lessons of Bo Xilai’s ‘Singing Red Song’
 Campaign as a Political Communication Project." Global Media Journal: Australian
 Edition 8.1 (2014): 1-13. Academia.edu. Web. 10 Dec. 2014. 
Huang, Hao. "Yaogun Yinyue: Rethinking Mainland Chinese Rock 'n' Roll." Popular Music 20.1
 (2001): 1-11. JSTOR. Web. 04 Mar. 2016. 
Iredale, Robyn R., Naran Bilik, and Fei Guo. China's Minorities on the Move: Selected Case 
Studies. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003. Print. 
Jacobs, Andrew. "Ethnic Protests in China Have Lengthy Roots." The New York Times. The New 
York Times, 10 June 2011. Web. 07 Apr. 2016. 
Jin, Jie. Chinese Music. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2011. Print. 
Jones, Andrew F. Like a Knife: Ideology and Genre in Contemporary Chinese Popular Music.
 Ithaca, NY: East Asia Program, Cornell U, 1992. Print. 
 91 
Jones, Andrew F. “The Politics of Popular Music in Post-Tiananmen China” in Susan D. Blum
 and Lionel M. Jensen (eds), China Off Center: Mapping the Margins of the Middle
 Kingdom. Honolulu: U of Hawai'i, 2002. Print. 
Kaarsholm, Preben, and Deborah James. "Popular Culture and Democracy in Some Southern
 Contexts: An Introduction." Journal of Southern African Studies 26.2 (2000): 189-208.
 Web. 
Kaiman, Jonathan, and Andrew Jacobs. "Ethnic Music Tests Limits in China." The New York
 Times. The New York Times, 16 July 2011. Web. 18 Apr. 2016. 
Kraus, Richard Curt. The Party and the Arty in China: The New Politics of Culture. Lanham,
 MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004. Print. 
Kuo-Huang, Han. "Folk songs of the Han Chinese: Characteristics and classifications." Asian
 Music 20.2 (1989): 107-128. Web. 
Lee, Gregory B. "The ‘East Is Red’ Goes Pop: Commodification, Hybridity and Nationalism in
 Chinese Popular Song and Its Televisual Performance." Popular Music 14.01 (1995): 95
 110. Web. 
Lee, Gregory B. Troubadours, Trumpeters, Troubled Makers: Lyricism, Nationalism, and
 Hybridity in China and Its Others. Durham: Duke UP, 1996. Print. 
Lee, Joseph Tse-Hei, Lida V. Nedilsky, and Siu-Keung Cheung, eds. China's Rise to Power:
 Conceptions of State Governance. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. Print. 
Li, Baochen. Shanmu Zhai Hua Dangnian (Reminiscences of Li Baochen). Taipei: Zhuanji
 Wenxue Chubanshe, 1967. Print. 
Litzinger, Ralph A. "Memory Work: Reconstituting the Ethnic in Post-Mao China." Cultural
 Anthropology 13.2 (1998): 224-55. Web. 
 92 
Liu, Jingzhi. A Critical History of New Music in China. Trans. Caroline Mason. Hong Kong:
 Chinese UP, 2010. Print. 
Llobera, Josep R. "Recent Theories of Nationalism." University College London Working Papers
 (1999): 1-22. Institut De Ciències Polítiques I Socials. Web. 10 Dec. 2014. 
Mackerras, C. "Folksongs and Dances of China's Minority Nationalities: Policy, Tradition, and
 Professionalization." Modern China 10.2 (1984): 187-226. Web. 
Makofsky, David. "The Artist and the Artisan in Xinjiang (China) Central Asia: The Changing 
Uyghur Muslim Culture." European Journal of Applied Social Sciences Research 1.1 
(2013): 29-34. Ejassr.org. Web. 18 Apr. 2016. 
Mao, Zedong. Mao Zedong's "Talks at the Yan'an Conference on Literature and Art": A
 Translation of the 1943 Text with Commentary. Trans. Bonnie S. McDougall. Ann Arbor:
 U of Michigan, 1980. Print. 
McDougall, Bonnie S., ed. Popular Chinese Literature and Performing Arts in the People's
 Republic of China, 1949-1979. Berkeley: U of California, 1984. Print. 
Montefiore, Clarissa S. "How China Distorts Its Minorities Through Propaganda." BBC Culture.
 BBC, 16 Dec. 2013. Web. 03 Nov. 2014. 
Mu, Yang. "Academic Ignorance or Political Taboo? Some Issues in China's Study of Its Folk
 Song Culture." Ethnomusicology 38.2 (1994): 303-20. Web. 
"Professor Liu: Min'ge Performance and Vocal Techniques." Personal interview. 4 Jan. 2016. 
"Professor Wang: Min'ge Performance and Vocal Techniques." Personal interview. 5 Jan. 2016. 
Ramsey, S. Robert. "The Languages of China." China off Center: Mapping the Margins of the 
Middle Kingdom. By Susan Debra Blum and Lionel M. Jensen. Honolulu: U of Hawai'i, 
2002. 45-64. Print. 
 93 
Rauhala, Emily. "The Politics of Pop in China's Xinjiang Region." Time World. Time, 24 Oct.
 2014. Web. 02 Nov. 2014. 
Rees, Helen. " “Authenticity” and the Foreign Audience for Traditional Music in Southwest
 China." GMUR Journal of Musicological Research 17.2 (1998): 135-61. Web. 
Schein, Louisa. "Gender and Internal Orientalism in China." Modern China 23.1 (1997):  
69-98. JSTOR. Web. 28 Apr. 2016. 
Schimmelpenninck, Antoinet. Chinese Folk Songs and Folk Singers: Shan'ge Traditions in
 Southern Jiangsu. Leiden: CHIME Foundation, 1997. Print. 
Spence, Jonathan D. The Search for Modern China. New York: W. W. Norton, 1991. Print. 
Tuohy, Sue. "The Sonic Dimensions of Nationalism in Modern China: Musical Representation
 and Transformation." Ethnomusicology 45.1 (2001): 107-31. JSTOR. Web. 03 Mar. 2016. 
Wang, Huihe. Zhongguo jinxiandai yinyueshi (A History of Modern Chinese Music). Beijing:
 Remin yinyue chubanshe, 1984. Print. 
Wang, Zheng. "National Humiliation, History Education, and the Politics of Historical Memory:
 Patriotic Education Campaign in China." International Studies Quarterly 52.4 (2008):
 783-806. JSTOR. Web. 04 Nov. 2014.  
Wasserstrom, Jeffrey N. China in the 21st Century: What Everyone Needs to Know. New York,
 NY: Oxford UP, 2010. Print. 
Wei, C.X. George, and Xiaoyuan Liu, eds. Chinese Nationalism in Perspective: Historical and
 Recent Cases. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2001. Print. 
Wong, Isabel K.F. “Geming gequ: Songs for the Education of the Masses.” In McDougall 1984,
 112-43. 
 94 
Wu, Guoguang. "From Post-imperial to Late Communist Nationalism: Historical Change in
 Chinese Nationalism from May Fourth to the 1990s." Third World Quarterly 29.3 (2008):
 467-82. Web. 4 Nov. 2014.  
Zhang, F. "The Rise of Chinese Exceptionalism in International Relations." European Journal of
 International Relations 19.2 (2011): 305-28. SAGE Journals. Web. 
Zhang, Jingwen. "Xi Calls for Preservation of Chinese Culture." CRI English News. Chinese 
Radio International, 25 Sept. 2014. Web. 17 Apr. 2016. 
Zhang, Yan. "Tianlu Han Hong Yanchang Gequ (Road to Heaven Song Profile)." Baidu Baike. 
Baidu, n.d. Web. 
Zhao, Suisheng. A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism.
 Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004. Print. 
Zheng, Yongnian. Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China: Modernization, Identity, and
 International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999. Print. 
Zhongyang yinyue xueyuan zhongguo yinyue yanjiusuo (Central Music Institute Chinese Music
 Research Institute). Minzu yinyue gailun (Outline of National Music). Beijing: Yinyue
 chubanshe, 1980. 
Zissis, Carin. "Chinese Train Carries Controversy." Analysis Brief. Council on Foreign Relations, 
31 Aug. 2006. Web. 8 Apr. 2016. 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 95 
APPENDIX 
 
FIGURE 1. Performance of traditional minority min’ge. 
 
Source:  
Huffington Post, “Spectacular Chinese Performance at World Peace Gala in Chicago”, 2011. 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jim-luce/spectacular-chinese-perfo_b_421001.html 
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FIGURE 2. Performance of Westernized min’ge. 
 
Source:  
All-China Women’s Federation, “Song Zuying Performs in Los Angeles”, 2013. 
http://www.womenofchina.cn/womenofchina/html1/news/celebrity/15/770-1.htm 
